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Self-Censorship by Media Industries
by Lewis Grossman'
What jailer so inexorable as one's selfi
- Nathaniel Hawthorne
l
INTRODUCTION
When liberal American legal scholars ponder the dangers of censorship,
they tend to concentrate on the kind of censorship that is perpetrated by
the government. Like good disciples of Locke and Jefferson, they believe
that there is a public realm of coercion and a private realm of freedom,
and that defenders of liberty should focus on keeping the former from
intruding on the latter. So long as federal, state and local government
officials do not abridge the First Amendment, many champions of free
speech are inclined to relax and assume that the system is in good
working order.
An exclusive focus on governmental censorship is inappropriate,
however, for as we shall see, in the course of recent American history,
institutions and individuals within the private realm have suppressed far
more speech than the government has. The many types of private
censorship range from the self-restraint exercised by an author who is
afraid of offending his readers to the organized nationwide boycott of a
film by a religious group. This article will not attempt to discuss all the
forms of private censorship that inhibit free expression in this country,
for an adequate treatment of the entire subject would fill a large book.
Instead, this article will focus on a particularly virulent type of private
censorship -- cooperative self-censorship by media industries. Many
media industries have practiced this type of censorship. Although their
self-policing arrangements have sometimes had only a limited effect on
the content of their products, at other times they have thoroughly
prevented certain subjects and ideas from reaching the public.
° Ph.D (candidate) history, Yale University; M.A. 1992, Yale University; J.D. 1990,
Harvard Law School; B.A. 1986, Yale University. Clerk (expected) 1992-93, Judge Abner
Mikva, Chief Judge, Federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
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1. NATHANIELHAWrHORNE, HOUSE OF SEVEN GABLES 169 (Milton R Stern ed., Penguin
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Section I will examine the efforts of four different industries to regulate
their own expression -- the Production Code and the ratings system of
the Motion Picture Association of America, the Comics Code of the
Comics Magazine Association of America, the Television Code of the
National Association of Broadcasters, and the labeling agreement of the
Recording Industry Association of America. By describing the develop-
ment of these voluntary agreements, this article will show that they were
not "voluntary" at all but rather were imposed on the media by the
government and by pressure groups. Section II, using the self-regulatory
mechanisms described in Section I as models, will further describe the
components of the different kinds of self-censorship schemes and will
examine the degree to which the particular structure of a self-censorship
mechanism determines its repressive effect.
A detailed analysis of the specific provisions of the codes and of the
precise effects that they have had on the content of the media are beyond
the scope of this article. It can simply be noted they have all restricted
the portrayal of crime, violence, sex and drug abuse, among other topics,
and have discouraged racial, ethnic and religious bigotry. In addition,
they have tended to be profoundly conservative and pro-authoritarian.
Consider, for example, this passage from the current Comics Code:
In general, recognizable national, social, political, cultural, ethnic and
racial groups, religious institutions, and law enforcement authorities will
be portrayed in a positive light. These include the government on the
national, state, and municipal levels, including all of its numerous
departments, agencies, and services; law enforcement agencies such as
the state and municipal police, and other actual law enforcement
agencies such as the FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, etc.; [and] the
military, both United States and foreign.'
Self-censorship agreements have often reduced media content into
simplistic and vacuous pro-establishment fables. Although many creators
have worked ingeniously within the constraints of the codes and have
produced excellent material despite them (the golden age of the movies
occurred at the height of the Production Code's power), media self-
regulation has forced many inventive and important ideas to remain
unexpressed. This fact is no less troubling because private corporations,
not government officials, have been the censors.
2. CODE OF THE COMICS MAGAZINE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (Comics Magazine
Association of America, New York, N.Y.) (on file with the Columbia-VLA Journal of Law
& the Arts).
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I. CYCLES OF CENSORSHIP, FOUR CASE STUDIES
Media businesses, like most others, are motivated primarily by the
desire for profit. It follows that they rarely regulate themselves in a
manner that would limit sales or advertising revenues unless external
pressure compels them to do so.
In the United States, the state is usually the source of the external
pressure that induces the media to perform self-censorship. As the
following examples demonstrate, the process is a cyclical one. Pressure
groups persuade a local or state government or the federal government
to act to "purify" a medium. The government exposes the industry's
excesses and threatens punitive measures unless it "cleans up its act."
The leaders of the industry are intimidated into cooperatively forming a
mechanism for self-regulation. The industry, being in the business of
communications, is usually well equipped to publicize its efforts and thus
to appease its critics. Then comes a period of relative calm, during which
the industry disseminates increasing amounts of offensive material, until
protest groups mobilize against it, and the process starts again.3
One curious aspect of this process is the manner in which the state
sometimes is able to intimidate an industry into adopting a system of
self-regulation more strict than the state could impose itself, given the
limitations of the First Amendment. It is clear why the media took
government threats seriously in the early part of this century. Prior to
1925, the Supreme Court refused to apply the First Amendment to state
regulation of speech.' More recently, however, the Supreme Court has
used the First Amendment strictly to limit government regulation of
speech.5 Many government threats against media industries thus seem
to be empty blustering. Yet the media still cower. Perhaps the prospect
of prolonged and expensive lawsuits frightens them. Or perhaps when
the government scolds and threatens a media industry, the industry
becomes a target of such public opprobrium that it feels compelled to
take action. It is encouraging to note, however, that as the state's power
to suppress expression has diminished, so too has the severity of the self-
regulation adopted by the media in response. The most important lesson
one can draw from the following examples is that the mere potential for
government censorship can be as dangerous as the actual exercise of that
power.
3. For another description of this cyclical process, see 0T0 N. LARSON, VIOLENCE AND
THE MASS MEDIA 237-38 (1968).
4. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
5. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kingsley Intl Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of the State of
New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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A. MOTION PICTURES
1. The Dawn of Self-Regulation
People began to cry for the government to censor motion pictures
almost from the moment that movies began to tell stories in dramatic
form with The Great Train Robbery in 1903. Like most advocates of
media censorship, early movie "bashers" were primarily concerned with
motion pictures' detrimental effects on children. By 1907, a Chicago
judge, in a letter to a Chicago newspaper, asserted that nickelodeons
"cause, indirectly or directly, more juvenile crime coming into my court
than all other causes combined."6
In response to the increasingly indignant flood of complaints, George
B. McClellan, the mayor of New York, revoked the license of every movie
house in the city in December 1908.7 Although film exhibitors success-
fully petitioned the courts for injunctions permitting the theaters to
reopen, industry leaders feared similar censorship efforts would succeed
in other cities. The nine principal producing companies decided to avert
government interference by jointly creating a body that would regulate
the content of their movies. In 1909, they agreed to submit all of their
films prior to release to a private motion picture censorship board in New
York composed of prominent civic and religious leaders.8 They promised
to cut any footage the board deemed objectionable, or even to scrap a film
entirely if the board so ordered. Motion pictures endorsed by the board
would display a seal of approval -- a pair of scissors superimposed on a
star. The age of media self-censorship was born.9
Although the board worked to control the content of motion pictures, 10
demands for government censorship continued. In 1911, Pennsylvania
passed the first state law regulating film content prior to exhibition,
followed shortly thereafter by Ohio and Kansas in 1913. In 1915, in
Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio,12 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the Ohio and Kansas statutes. Justice McKenna
noted that "the exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit."13 From this observation, he
6. MURRAY SCHUMACH, THE FACE ON THE CUTTING ROOM FLOOR 16 (1964).
7. ROBERT SKLAR, MOVIE-MADE AMERICA 30-31 (1975).
8. Id. at 31.
9. For a more detailed account of these events, see id. at 30-32.
10. The board refused to approve about 20% of the films it reviewed and often
required the producers to make cuts in movies that it passed. Id. at 32.
11. Act of June 19, 1911, 1911 Pa. Laws 1007; Act of April 16, 1913, 103 Ohio Laws
399; Act of March 13, 1913, ch. 294, 1913 Kan. Sess. Laws 504.
12. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
13. Id. at 244.
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illogically concluded that the free speech and free press provisions of the
state constitutions did not protect the movies against government
censorship.
14
The Mutual Film decision did not immediately lead to a spate of
governmental censorship. Maryland was the only state that established
a movie censorship board during the next several years.1 5 Many states
and municipalities were, however, prepared to regulate the film industry
if it did not adequately regulate itself; by the end of 1921, 36 states were
considering censorship legislation. 16 Calls for federal censorship also
increased after Congress held hearings in the mid 1910s that examined
the depravity of motion pictures.
7
The specter of hundreds of censorship boards enforcing hundreds of
different versions of morality frightened industry leaders. To discourage
government interference, they attempted a series of self-regulatory
measures. First, they established a short-lived organization called the
National Board of Review. Subsequently, in 1919, they formed the
National Association of the Motion Picture Industry. As Murray
Schumach observed, however, the movie barons' "suspicion of one
another led them to violate the rules of their young association so
flagrantly that the association became a mockery."
'
In 1922, with the scandalous lives of movie stars causing as much
public consternation (and titillation) as the content of their films, the
movie moguls made their boldest attempt yet to stave off government
censorship. They hired President Harding's Postmaster General, Will H.
Hays, to head a new association called the Motion Picture Producers and
Distributors Association of America (MPPDA).19 Although filmmakers
submitted synopses of their screenplays to the "Hays Office" for advice
about what they should cut, Hays spent much more time lobbying his
14. Id. The Court considered only the state constitutions' free expression provisions
because it had not yet applied the First Amendment of the United States Constitution to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. It would not do so until 1925, in Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). After 1925, however, the Court's decision in Mutual Film
was extended to deny motion pictures federal constitutional protection as well. For four
decades, Mutual Film upheld the power of prior restraint of movies by the government. The
Court finally granted films First Amendment protection in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952).
15. SKLAR, supra note 7, at 31.
16. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 19.
17. See Hearings on the [Establishment of the] Motion Picture Commission Before the
House Committee on Education, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1914); Hearings on Trust Legislation
Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1914); Hearings on
Prohibiting Shipment of Certain Motion-Picture Films Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
The congressional hearing became the legislative branch's favorite tool for pressuring the
media into self-censorship. It was used repeatedly throughout the century.
18. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 18.
19. SKLAR, supra note 7, at 82-83.
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political friends and nursing the industry's image than he did expurgat-
ing movies.
2. The Age of the Production Code
While Hays extolled the purity of motion pictures, filmmakers
continued to add sex and violence to their creations. During the Great
Depression, the struggling studios, desperate to attract audiences,
released increasingly provocative films.2D The introduction of sound to
movies meant that risqud motion pictures offended two senses instead of
just one. Once again, the film industry came under attack, particularly
from the Catholic Church. In 1930, to discourage the formation of state
and local movie censorship boards, the studios invited Martin Quigley,
a Catholic publisher, and Daniel Lord, a Jesuit priest, to draft the
Motion Picture Production Code.
2 1
Robert Sklar has observed that the Production Code "went about as far
as it could toward expressing the Catholic bishops' viewpoint without
converting the movies from entertainment to popular theology."22 The
Production Code strictly regulated the depiction of many subjects,
including crime, sex and religion. Although it permitted the depiction of
"crime, wrong-doing, evil, and sin"23 if they were essential to the plot,
it did so within a system of compensating moral values. In other words,
every film had to make clear that "evil is wrong and good is right."
2
Once again, however, the studios had formulated a scheme which was
designed to appease their critics without actually censoring films. During
its first four years, the Production Code had virtually no impact on the
content of motion pictures. A "studio relations committee" applied the
code, but it had no power to enforce its judgments. It could appeal for
enforcement to an appellate group composed of officials of the top movie
companies, but this group, known as the "Hollywood Jury," always
favored the producers.'
20. Id. at 174.
21. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 20.
22. SKLAR, supra note 7, at 173.
23. MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION CODE, reprinted in SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 279-
80.
24. Id. at 279. The three "General Principles" of the code were:
1. No picture shall be produced which will lower the moral standards of those
who see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience shall never be thrown to the side
of crime, wrong-doing, evil or sin.
2. Correct standards of life, subject only to the requirements of drama and
entertainment, shall be presented.
3. Law -- divine, natural, or human -- shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy
be created for its violation.
Id. at 288.
25. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 21.
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As illustrated, each round of public and governmental pressure drove
the motion picture industry to adopt a more elaborate, yet always
impotent, self-regulation mechanism. The failure of the 1930 arrange-
ment to improve the moral tone of movies provoked an outraged response
that finally forced the producers to adopt a genuine system of self-
censorship. In 1933, probably with impetus from the Vatican, a
committee of Catholic bishops announced the formation of the Legion of
Decency, 26 which planned a nationwide boycott of indecent films. Within
ten weeks, eleven million Americans, including many Protestants and
Jews, signed the agreement to observe the boycott.27 In addition, the
Federal Council of Churches warned the movie moguls that it would seek
federal censorship unless they strictly policed themselves. 2
The movie industry, already financially unhealthy, finally capitulated
in order to avoid economic disaster as well as governmental intervention.
The MPPDA put teeth into the Production Code by creating a rigorous
enforcement mechanism. It established a new body called the Production
Code Administration. With the approval of the bishops, it installed
Joseph Breen, a Catholic, as its head.29 The MPPDA empowered Breen
to withhold the Code Seal of Approval from any film that violated the
Production Code. The studios pledged not to distribute or exhibit movies
that did not bear the seal. The Hays Office assumed the power to impose
a $25,000 fine on any member of the MPPDA who released or displayed
a movie without the seal. This new method of self-regulation was so
successful that the provision for fines proved to be unnecessary. For
nineteen years after 1934, not one theater in the United States showed
a movie produced by a major studio that did not bear the seal. 3
There were a number of reasons for the system's effectiveness. First of
all, in the years before television, the lack of competition from other
forms of entertainment ensured the success of even the blandest films. 31
Second, and perhaps most important, the film industry was a quintessen-
tial vertically integrated oligopoly. The major studios owned controlling
interests in most of the important first run theaters in the United
States.32 They saw to it that these theaters would not exhibit movies
without the seal. This arrangement permitted the MPPDA to prevent
26. SKLAR, supra note 7, at 173.
27. Id.
28. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 21.
29. SKLAR, supra note 7, at 173.
30. Jane M. Friedman, The Motion Picture Rating System of 1968: A Constitutional
Analysis of Self-Regulation by the Film Industry, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 185, 188 (1973).
31. In any case, as Robert Sklar observed, audiences in the depressed 1930s and war-
torn 1940s wanted movies to provide them with an escape from tension and insecurity and
thus did not mind the absence of violence and social criticism. SKLAR, supra note 7, at 174.
32. In 1948, at least 70% of first run theaters in cities with populations over 100,000
were affiliated with the five largest studios, all members of the MPPDA. United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 167 (1948).
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even non-members from circumventing the Production Code. Third,
because Mutual Film was still the law, the motion picture industry was
extremely wary of the numerous state and local censorship boards
throughout the nation.33 The Legion of Decency, which supported and
monitored the Production Code, was clearly prepared to pressure these
boards into censoring films if the industry did not observe the Production
Code's constraints. These three factors -- the absence of alternative forms
of mass entertainment, the industry's monopolistic structure, and the
fear of government censorship -- allowed the Production Code to reign for
two decades as a system of self-regulation no less effective than
government censorship at controlling the content of motion pictures. In
the late 1940s and 1950s, however, some changes occurred that caused
this fragile voluntary structure to crumble.
First, television emerged as a powerful competitor to the movies. 34 As
many Americans acquired televisions, movie attendance plummeted.
Many people saw no reason to go to the movies when they could view
similarly inoffensive family fare at home on television. Moviemakers thus
felt pressured to present themes and images unavailable on television in
order to keep their audience.
a5
Second, in 1948, the federal courts stripped the major studios of their
monopolistic domination over the movie industry. In United States v.
Paramount Pictures, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, on remand from the United States Supreme
Court,36 compelled the studios to divest themselves of their theaters on
antitrust grounds. The courts thus separated the production and distri-
bution of movies from their exhibition. Such separation allowed
independent and foreign producers who were not members of the
Association (now known as the Motion Picture Association of America,
or MPAA) to show films without the Code Seal of Approval in first-run
theaters, which the studios no longer controlled. Exhibitors were free to
display whatever films they felt their audiences wanted to see. The Hays
Office no longer had the final say over the content of almost every film
shown in America.
33. Roy Eugene Bates, Note, Private Censorship of the Movies, 22 STAN. L. REV. 618,
619 (1970). Mutual Film was overruled in 1952 by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952).
34. In 1948, almost a million television sets were sold. GIRAUD CHESTER ET AL,
TELEVISION AND RADIO 41 (5th ed. 1978).
35. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 89.
36. 334 U.S. 131 (1948), remanded, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
37. The Court in Paramount failed to discern the impact that the structure of the
movie industry had on the content of motion pictures. It asserted,
the question here is not what the public will see or if the public will be permitted
to see certain features. It is clear that under the existing system the public will
be denied access to none. If the public cannot see the features on the first-run, it
may do so on the second, third, fourth, or later run.
450
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A third development that contributed to the end of the Production
Code's dominance was a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court
finally recognized movies as a form of expression entitled to constitution-
al protection. In 1952, the Court at last declared, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, that "expression by means of motion pictures is included
within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments."' Twelve years later, Jacobellis v. OhioM conclu-
sively established that only obscene movies were outside the protection
of the First Amendment. Further, in Freedman v. Maryland,0 the
Court held that prior censorship arrangements by state and local
governments must include strict procedural safeguards to satisfy the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The rise of Constitutional protection for movies eased the industry's
fears of government censorship. It became apparent that the government
did not have nearly as much power as it once did to regulate the content
of films. Court rulings dramatically reduced the number of local
censorship boards.41 The primary motive for self-censorship -- to stave
off government interference -- largely vanished.42 The emboldened
studios pushed through looser Production Code standards and called for
tolerant interpretations of its provisions. Some ignored the Production
334 U.S. at 166-67. The Court failed to comprehend that films that were denied the
opportunity to be exhibited in first-run theaters would so likely be unprofitable that they
would rarely be made at all.
38. 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). The Court refreshingly exposed the absurdity of the
reasoning in Mutual Film:
It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment's aegis
because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business
conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. That books, newspapers, and
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a
form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.
Id.
39. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
40. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
41. By 1969, just four years after Freedman, only one state and a handful of cities had
motion picture licensing systems. Bates, supra note 33, at 621 n.18.
42. There still existed incentives not to dissolve the Code Administration completely.
The possibility for boycotts still existed, although the increasingly liberal mores of the
American public made attempts at such concerted actions less likely to be successful.
Furthermore, local censors could make life very difficult for filmmakers, even if the courts
would eventually block them. In 1964, one motion picture expert noted that local censors
often realize that they are on shaky legal ground, "[b]ut they bludgeon distributors into
doing what they wish with veiled threats. The distributor, rather than engage in what may
be a long and costly lawsuit, goes along with them." Quoted in SCHUMACH, supra note 6,
at 201.
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Code altogether.43 The Hays office became an impotent shadow of its
former self.
3. The Emergence of Classification
By the 1960s, with the deterioration of the Production Code and the
dissemination of more explicit movies, it.was time for the next cycle in
the history of self-regulation to commence. The demand grew for some
form of government regulation. Public officials began to respond to this
pressure. In 1963, Iowa Congressman John Henry Kyl introduced a
resolution that called for the industry to "put its house in order" or face
federal censorship." State and local governments searched for constitu-
tional ways to control movie content. In 1964, the Supreme Court seemed
to hold open a door. In Jacobellis, Justice Brennan suggested that laws
that otherwise violated the First Amendment might be constitutional if
they were "aimed specifically at children.,
45
In 1965, the Dallas city council passed a film classification ordinance
designed only to protect children.46 According to the ordinance, if the
Dallas Motion Picture Classification Board deemed a picture "not
suitable for young persons, ,47 children under sixteen years old would
not be permitted to attend. New York State had a similar statute which
made it unlawful to sell to a minor a ticket to a movie that portrayed
"nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse which is harmful to
minors.
' ' 8
The Supreme Court heard challenges to these statutes and announced
both decisions on the same day in 1968. The holdings made the movie
industry shudder. In Ginsberg v. New York, the Court found the New
York statute to be constitutional, based on a theory of "variable
obscenity. "49 The Court held that a state could regulate the dissemina-
tion of material to minors that is obscene as to them, even if it is not
obscene as to adults. In Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, the Court found the
Dallas movie classification ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague, but
it made clear that, in light of Ginsberg, the only impermissible aspect of
the law was the "absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite
43. In 1953, United Artists released Otto Preminger's The Moon is Blue without
approval. The studio defied the Production Code again three years later by releasing
Preminger's Man with the Golden Arm without a seal. The studio made healthy profits on
both.
44. H.R Res. 255, 88th Congress, 1st sess. (1963).
45. 378 U.S. at 195.
46. DALLAS, TEX., REV. CODE OF CIV. & CRIM. ORDINANCES ch. 46A (1965).
47. Id,
48. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965) (repealed 1967).
49. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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standards for the officials to follow. . ."5 The Court thus implied that
a properly drawn classification statute could be constitutional.
Jack Valenti, a former White House adviser to Lyndon Johnson who
was now the president of the MPAA, felt that the Court's pronounce-
ments constituted an open invitation to establish state and local review
boards. If hundreds of jurisdictions formed their own classification
systems, the result would be chaos. He determined that the industry
must make a conciliatory move to quiet public demands for government
regulation.
The MPAA's resulting strategy strikingly demonstrates how the nature
of media self-censorship largely depends on the extent of the state's
censorship power. In 1968, the MPAA, in conjunction with the National
Association of Theater Owners (NATO) and the International Film
Importers and Distributors of America (IFIDA), established a new
ratings system. It was the type of scheme that Interstate Circuit had
suggested a government could constitutionally enforce if it were properly
drawn.
The classification scheme that the industry agreed to in 1968 is still in
effect today, with some minor changes. MPAA and IFIDA members
submit films that they produce or distribute to an organization called the
Code and Rating Administration (CARA). Nonmembers are also invited
to submit their films. CARA is composed of a chairman appointed by the
president of the MPAA and ten "average" American parents otherwise
unconnected to the motion picture industry.
CARA evaluates each film based on the categories of violence, drugs,
sensuality, language and theme and assigns it one of five ratings. The
MPAA defines the ratings in the following manner:
"G" General audiences -- all ages admitted.
"PG" Parental guidance suggested; some material may be
unsuitable for children.
"PG-13" Parents strongly cautioned. Some material may be
inappropriate for children under 13.
1111 Restricted. Under 17 requires accompanying parent or
adult guardian.
"NC-17" No children under 17 admitted.51
50. 390 U.S. 676,690 (1968) (quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,271 (1951).
51. Glenn Collins, Guidance or Censorship? New Debate on Rating Films, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1990, at Cll, C17. "NC-17" was known as "X" until September 1990, when the
MPAA changed the name of the rating in response to criticism of the stigma associated
with the "X' rating. See infra part II.A. Early in the history of the ratings system, "PG" was
called "M" ("Suggested for mature audiences") and the age of maturity for the purposes of
"R" and "X" was 16 instead of 17. The "PG-13" rating did not exist until 1984, when director
Steven Spielberg led a successful campaign for a new rating to address the concerns raised
by pictures which might be too intense or frightening for pre-teens.
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Producers can either accept the rating, resubmit the film after making
cuts, or appeal the classification to the Code and Ratings Appeals Board,
composed of the MPAA president and twenty-two representatives of
MPAA, NATO and IFIDA companies. A producer who does not submit
his film to CARA may either give it an NC-17 himself or distribute it
without a rating, in which case cooperating theaters that exhibit it must
designate it NC-17, regardless of its content. 2 Since many theaters
refuse to show unrated films, moviemakers adhere to the agreement
most of the time.
Although the ratings system has been subject to some criticism for the
lack of specific information it provides, it is for the most part popular.5
3
Polls show that 70% to 73% of parents find it useful.5' As for the
system's primary goal, Valenti insists that "the ratings helped defuse
movements by the federal government and individual states to censor
movies."s3 He points out that before he took over the MPAA, there were
more than 100 legislative bills pending to control movie content, and that
after he implemented the ratings system, these bills were all withdrawn.
Valenti's defense of the classification system epitomizes the motivating
force behind the entire history of motion picture self-censorship. "If there
were no voluntary system, something would fill that vacuum. Moral
Majority would get city councils and state legislatures to do so. I think
a dark curtain would descend on creativity in the cinema."56
B. COMIC BOOKS
Today, when Americans spend so much time watching television that
many seem to read nothing at all, it is easy to forget what an important
pastime comic books were forty years ago. In 1949, Americans bought
about 720 million comic books, compared to 130 million in 1987.s 7 A poll
taken in 1947 (before the peak in circulation) showed that 87% of
adolescent boys, 81% of adolescent girls and 41% of adult males between
eighteen and thirty years old read comic books regularly.m
52. Bates, supra note 33, at 623.
53. In September 1990, in response to such criticism, the MPAA announced that each
time a film received an R rating, it would issue an explanation of why the movie was placed
in that category to film reviewers and theater owners.
54. Collins, supra note 51, at ClI.
55. Valenti Rates Movie Ratings, UPI, BC Cycle, Nov. 12, 1988.
56. Moira Hodgson, Movie Ratings - Do They Serve Hollywood or the Public?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1981, § 2, at 1, 13.
57. Richard W. Anderson, Biff' Pow! Comic Books Make a Comeback, Bus. WK., Sept.
2, 1985, at 59; Nancy Miller, Fantasy Fads; Faster Than a Speeding Bullet, Comic Book
Sales Take Off, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1987, at 2. Comic book circulation reached a nadir of
48 million per year in 1979. Anderson, supra.
58. Marya Mannes, Junior Has a Craving, NEW REPUBLIc, Feb. 17, 1947, at 20, 22.
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During the 1940s and 19 50s, the popularity of comic books was
accompanied by an almost hysterical concern about their effects on
youngsters. In 1945, a Time article titled "Are Comics Fascist?" cited an
expert who declared, "Superman is a Nazi." 9 Critic John Mason Brown
dubbed comic books "the marijuana of the nursery."60 Psychiatrist
Fredric Wertham, the leading foe of comic books, wrote a widely-read
treatise titled Seduction of the Innocent, which blamed the comics for
undermining the morality of America's youth and causing juvenile
delinquency.61 Even so prominent a figure as newspaper columnist
Walter Lippmann asserted that "comic books are purveying violence and
lust to a vicious and intolerable degree."6 2
Although all types of comic books alarmed some parents, educators,
journalists and government officials, the genre that spurred the
censorship forces into action was crime comic books. These extraordinari-
ly popular magazines specialized in explicit and violent portrayals of
gruesome and shocking crimes. In the late 1940s, they generated a few
highly publicized copycat incidents, in which children reenacted episodes
that they had read about.63
Occurrences like these intensified the anti-comic movement. Although
some local government authorities moved to regulate offensive comic
books,6' private individuals and groups worked most actively to control
the magazines' contents before 1948.65 Nonetheless, comic book
publishers knew all too well from the history of motion pictures how
private pressure could lead to government censorship. Like the movie
moguls, they undertook to implement a self-policing system that would
calm their critics.
The comic book industry's first attempt at cooperative self-regulation
was, however, as feeble as the motion picture industry's early efforts. In
59. Are Comics Fascist?, TIME, Oct. 22, 1945, at 67.
60. Code for the Comics, TIME, July 12, 1948, at 62.
61. FREDRIC WERTHAM, THE SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1954). The tone of
Wertham's criticism of the comics is captured by his bizarre accusation that Batman and
Robin were a "wish dream of two homosexuals living together." Mark Vaz, Holy Birthday!
He's 50, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1989, (Tempo), at 1.
62. Fredric Wertham, It's Still Murder, SATURDAY REv., Apr. 9, 1955, at 12.
63. See, e.g., Comic Book Inspires Boys' Torture of Pal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1948, at
17. This story reports, "Three small boys strung up a playmate by his neck and tortured
him, police said today, adding that they were re-enacting the plot of a comic book." Id. The
year before, in another widely reported incident, a young Pittsburgh boy hanged himself,
apparently inspired by a comic book. Comics Blamed in Death, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1947,
at 12.
64. For instance, after the torturing incident mentioned in note 63, authorities in the
county where it took place asked for a ban on the sale of comic books dealing with crime
and torture. Comic Book Inspires Boys' Torture of Pal, supra note 63.
65. Besides journalists, persistent critics of the comics included educators and parents'
groups. See, e.g., Clean-Up Started by Comics Books As Editors Adopt Self-Policing Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1948, at 23.
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July 1948, fourteen major publishers announced the formation of an
organization called the Association of Comics Magazine Publishers and
the adoption of a six-point code of ethics.6 The Comics Code prohibited,
among other things, presentations of crime that "throw sympathy against
law and justice or . . . inspire others with the desire for imitation,"
"scenes of sadistic torture," and "sexy, wanton comics."67
Participating publishers submitted their manuscripts to Harry Schultz,
the executive director of the Association, who inspected them and
awarded a seal of approval to comics that conformed to the code.68 The
system clearly paralleled the movie industry's highly successful and
popular self-censorship methods. 9 In operation, however, the 1948
Comics Code proved to be as ineffectual as the Motion Picture Production
Code was between 1930 and 1934, before an adequate enforcement
mechanism (the Breen Office) was established.
There were several explanations for the system's lack of success. First
of all, the publishers who agreed to participate represented less than
one-third of the comic books sold.70 Second, the Comic Code itself was
brief, broadly worded and full of loopholes. Third, Schultz conducted the
evaluation program informally, and, by his own admission, he made
unjustified approvals.7 1 Consequently, the Comic Code did little to
eliminate crime comic books.72
Nor did it placate those calling for outside control, at least initially. If
anything, the industry's action seemed temporarily to worsen matters by
drawing further attention to the crime comics' outrageous plots and lurid
pictures. Private groups raged against the corruption of America's
children by these publications. In December 1948, just three years after
the fall of Nazi Germany, students at a Catholic boys' school in
Binghamton, New York, held a comic book burning, where they destroyed
a thousand "indecent" comic books.
The National Council of Parents and Teachers and other private
organizations demanded governmental action on the state and local
level.73 By the end of 1948, fifty American cities had taken steps to
66. Id. at 23.
67. Id.
68. The seal read, "Authorized ACMP. Conforms to Comics Code."
69. The similarities between the two systems were noted at the time by the press. See,
e.g., Code for the Comics, supra note 60.
70. The publishers who enrolled in the association released 15 million of the 50
million comics sold monthly. See Clean-Up Started by Comics Books As Editors Adopt Self-
Policing Plan, supra note 65.
71. Note, Regulation of Comic Books, 68 HARV. L. REV. 489, 505 (1955).
72. Fredric Wertham, bemoaning the inadequacy of the code, observed that while in
1947, one-tenth of all comics dealt exclusively with crime, in 1948, despite the introduction
of the code, that figure rose to one-third. Dorothy Barclay, Army to Limit Sale of Comics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1949, at 26.
73. Seek Comic Book Censor, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 17, 1948, at 30.
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regulate or ban objectionable comic books.74 Some cities established
censorship committees to pass on books before sale.75 Los Angeles
passed an ordinance making it a misdemeanor to sell or give a minor a
comic book "in which there is prominently featured an account of
crime."76 In early 1949, the New York State Legislature overwhelmingly
passed a bill that made it a crime to print or sell books or magazines
devoted principally to accounts of "bloodshed, lust, or heinous acts."77
Sheriffs and district attorneys around the country threatened to take
action against sellers of offensive comic books.
This anti-comics passion soon burned itself out, however. It is difficult
to ascertain the degree to which the self-regulation and public relations
efforts of the Association were responsible for dousing it. During 1949,
there was a drop in the number of crime comic books, which may have
appeased some critics. 78 A few sensible government officials also helped
temporarily to calm the censorship frenzy. Governor Thomas Dewey
declared the New York bill unconstitutional and vetoed it, and a
California court struck down the Los Angeles ordinance on constitutional
grounds. At the beginning of 1950, Schultz declared that the hysteria
was over.
79
The industry's reprieve did not last long, however. The history of comic
book censorship proved to have a cyclical nature strikingly similar to the
history of motion picture censorship. As the first wave of opposition
receded, publishers increasingly disregarded the ineffectual code and
tested the limits of the public's tolerance. In order to reverse a marked
drop in circulation, they released many crime comic books.80 Further-
more, in 1950, publisher William Gaines introduced a new genre, the
horror comic. These curious and popular magazines presented gruesome,
violent, supernatural tales. One horror comic, for example, depicted the
story of a grave digger who fell in love with a beautiful woman, killed
her in a fit of passion, made love to her corpse, and was strangled to
death when rigor mortis set in.8 '
74. Modern Comics Hit By Mayor's Report: Code of Standards Is Accepted by Minority
of Publishers and Controls Stressed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1948, at 50.
75. Oneida, New York and East Hartford, Connecticut were among the cities that took
such measures. Id
76. Objectionable Books of Comics Disappear From Los Angeles Stands After New
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1948, at 26.
77. Douglas Dales, State Senate Acts to Control Comics, Passes Feinberg Bill Calling
for Review of Books By Unit of Education Department, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1949, at 17.
78. Madeleine Loeb, Anti-Comics Drive Reported Waning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1950,
at 9.
79. Id.
80. The only concession that many publishers made was to drop the word "Crime"
from their titles. In fact, for many publishers this policy was a transparent attempt to
disguise the fact that the content of their magazines had changed very little.
81. Horror on the Newsstands, TIME, Sept. 27, 1954, at 77.
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In reaction to such publications, the anti-comic book movement, which
had never completely disappeared, began to simmer again. A special New
York State joint legislative committee that had been established in 1949
held new hearings and pestered the industry. In 1951, the committee
issued a report recommending that the publishers set up a more effective
self-policing organization patterned after the Hays Office. It warned
ominously, "They can do it for themselves or the State will be compelled
to do it for them.
8 2
The industry did not heed the committee's threat, so the next year the
committee offered six bills regulating the sale of objectionable comic
books, one of which easily sailed through both houses of the legisla-
ture.' Once again, however, Governor Dewey vetoed the bill because he
deemed it unconstitutionally vague.
Despite such episodes, comic book foes worked in relative obscurity
during the early 1950s. The press, which had covered the comic book
wars intensively in the late 1940s, hardly mentioned comic books from
1950 through 1953.8' In 1954, however, the issue exploded onto the
front page when the United States Senate subjected the comic book
industry to a public hearing in order to expose it to widespread scrutiny
and opprobrium. Congress had previously made the motion picture
industry the target of such hearings and would later do the same to the
television and record industries.
The comic book hearings were held in New York City in the spring of
1954.85 The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency, under the chairmanship of Senator Estes
Kefauver, conducted the hearings. The televised sessions were replete
with impassioned condemnations of comic books by mental health
experts and equally vehement defenses by representatives of the indus-
try.86 In its report, the subcommittee rejected federal legislation. It
82. Trade Told to Police Offensive Comic Books or Face Regulation by State
Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1951, at 33.
83. This bill made it unlawful "to publish or sell to minors comic books dealing with
fictional crime, bloodshed, or lust, that might incite minors to violence or immorality."
Comic Book Curbs Voted In Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1952, at 42. The Assembly
approved this bill by a vote of 141-4. Id.
84. In indices such as the New York Times Index and the Reader's Guide to Periodical
Literature, the number of entries under the heading "Comics" drops dramatically after 1949.
85. Perhaps not coincidentally, the New York Times placed its front page story about
the comic book hearing directly below a story about the McCarthy hearings. W.H.
Lawrence, McCarthy Hearing Will Start Today, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1954, at 1.
86. The hearings produced some entertaining exchanges. For instance, the following
dialogue occurred between Senator Kefauver and William Gaines, a comic book publisher
and the inventor of horror comics:
Senator Kefauver: Here is your May 22 issue. This seems to be a man with a
bloody ax holding a woman's head up which has been severed from her body. Do
you think that is in good taste?
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encouraged state and local action but hoped that "public pressure,
resulting from the hearings, may do as much good as anything else [by
leading the comic book industry to] dust off, and enforce, a code of good
taste that has been lying dormant for several years. 8 7
The subcommittee's strategy worked. In the autumn of 1954, as
galvanized pressure groups pushed local governments around the country
to act against crime and horror comics, the comic book industry finally
took strong concerted action to protect itself from outside interference.
It attempted to still the cries for censorship by promising to censor itself.
The publishers formed a new association called the Comics Magazine
Association of America (CMAA) and wrote a new comics code that all
CMAA members had to obey. Of the thirty-one major publishers, twenty
eight joined, representing 75% of the industry's output.88 The publishers
named Charles F. Murphy, a former New York City magistrate, as their
"czar" and official censor.89
The member publishers agreed to submit all comic books to the Comics
Code Authority, composed of Murphy and his staff, prior to publication.
As the Code Administrator, he would grant comic books that conformed
with the code a seal that stated "Approved by the Comics Code Authori-
ty." He would order revisions in magazines that failed to satisfy the
Comics Code's provisions. Publishers could appeal his decisions to a
permanent committee. The penalty for failure to abide by this arrange-
Mr. Gaines: Yes, sir; I do, for the cover of a horror comic. A cover in bad taste, for
example, might be defined as holding the head a little higher so that the neck
could be seen dripping blood from it ....
Senator Kefauver: You have blood coming out of her mouth.
Mr. Gaines: A little.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 97-109 (1954), quoted in LARSON, supra note 3, at
223.
87. Nona Brown, Reform of Comic Books Is Spurred By Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1954, § 4, at 7.
88. Dorothy Barclay, 'New' Comic Books To Be Out In Week, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
1954, at 8. These statistics are somewhat misleading. One of the publishers that refused
to join the CMAA was Dell, the nation's largest publisher of comic books. Dell, a purveyor
of totally inoffensive juvenile comics, refused to submit to the Comics Code because it
believed that its own standards were more stringent than those of the code. The other
major publisher* that stayed out of the CMAA was the Gilberton Company, which
specialized in comics based on famous works of literature. It refused to tamper with classic
stories. So, in fact, extremely few comic books in America violated the code in a meaningful
way.
89. Like Hays, the original president of the MPAA, Murphy was a respected citizen,
unconnected to the industry, who had governmental connections. It should be noted,
however, that despite the easy comparisons drawn between Murphy, on the one hand, and
Hays and his successor Eric Johnston, on the other, Murphy's true counterpart in the
motion picture industry was Joseph Breen, the Production Code Administrator. The
president of the CMAA was not Murphy, but John Goldwater, co-publisher of Archie
Comics.
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ment was expulsion from the CMAA and notification of newsdealers,
many of whom presumably would refuse to sell the offending publisher's
products.
The Comics Code was a detailed document noteworthy for its conserva-
tive and puritanical tone. It banned "profanity, obscenity, smut, [and]
vulgarity," as well as "scenes of horror, excessive bloodshed, gory or
gruesome crimes, depravity, lust, sadism [and] masochism."9 It
required that "all characters shall be depicted in dress reasonably
acceptable to society, [with] females drawn realistically without
exaggeration of any physical qualities."9' The code created a fantasy
world in which "[ihn every instance good shall triumph over evil."g It
was a world with no "walking dead, torture, vampires and vampirism,
ghouls, cannibalism, and werewolfism," with no "disrespect for estab-
lished authority. 9 3 The Comics Code was likely, as Murphy promised,
"the strongest code of ethics ever adopted by a mass media industry.",
Although the enforcement mechanism was not immediately successful,
individuals, private organizations and governments continued to attack
indecent comic books, and they soon pressured the Comics Code
Authority into diligently applying the code.95 Crime and horror comic
books disappeared, as did most of the smaller publishers, many of whom
depended on these genres. 96
In order to comply with the code, the remaining publishers turned to
a bland assortment of amusing anthropomorphized animals and righ-
teous superheroes who inevitably (and bloodlessly) apprehended evil
villains. The authority's work was so successful that by 1960, the
National Office for Decent Literature declared it could find no comics
that were objectionable for youth.9 7
The Comics Code is still in force today, but the majority of comic books
no longer present a sanitized and simplistic vision of the world. In the
90. CODE OF THE COMICS MAGAZINE ASSOCAT1ON OF AMERICA, supra note 2.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Emma Harrison, Magistrate Is Made Comics 'Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1954,
at 1, 25.
95. In 1955, 13 states enacted laws to curb comic books depicting horror, sex or violent
crime and two others formed committees to study the problem. Comic Book Curb Grows,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1955, § 3, at 24. National and local organizations continued to monitor
critically comic book content. Wertham, who had recently published a widely read
condemnation of comic books titled Seduction of the Innocents, refused to acknowledge im-
provement and continued his crusade against bad comic books. See Wertham, supra note
62.
96. Although the rise of television contributed to their demise, the introduction of the
Comics Code may have been the most important factor.
97. John Tebbel, Who Says the Comics are Dead?, SATURDAY REV., Dec. 10, 1960, at
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early 1960s, artists and writers began to produce less formalized and
more socially conscious comic books populated by characters with
realistic human qualities. 98 Comic book publishers grew increasingly
daring over the following two decades. By the late 1980s, comic books
offered shocking violence and explicit sex as well as stinging social
commentary. 99 Some current comic books make the horror and crime
comics seem quaint by comparison.
There are a number of reasons why such comic books are sold today
despite the Comics Code's regulations. Although the code remains
thorough and quite rigid, the CMAA has liberalized it somewhat. 1°°
More importantly, the code administrator simply has failed to enforce it
rigorously. He awards the seal of approval to comic books that publishers
twenty years ago would not even have bothered to submit to him. He
clearly understands that racier publications allowed the previously ailing
industry to more than double in size in the 1980s. Michael Silberkleit,
the publisher of Archie Comics and current president of the CMAA,
acknowledges that the Comics Code Authority certifies extremely lurid
and violent material. He remarks, "You wouldn't want to see what
doesn't get approved."10
In fact, many comic books are now sold without the CMAA seal of
approval. Magazine distributors and many newsstands have abandoned
the comic book business. Instead, direct distributors sell comic books to
a network of between 3,500 and 5,000 specialized comic stores around
the country. These specialty shops, most of which emerged in the 1980s,
now sell at least two-thirds of the comic books sold in the United
States. 1°2 They carry many publications that have not been submitted
to the Comics Code Authority.
Some of the comic books that lack the seal of approval are published
by small independent presses who are not CMAA members. These
independent publishers produce intensely violent and graphically
pornographic comic books, as well as a few creative and intelligent
98. Television was largely responsible for this development; not only did it help create
the financial woes which drove the desperate publishers to improve their product, but it
also drew a great deal of critical attention -attention which otherwise might have been
directed at comic books. See infra part I.C.
99. See Joe Queenan, Drawing on the Dark Side, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1989,
(Magazine), at 32.
100. The CMAA revised the code for the first time in 1971, to allow comic books to deal
more easily with criminal acts, sex, the occult and contemporary language. Later that year,
the members of the CMAA agreed to give themselves permission to treat responsibly the
subject of drugs.
101. Queenan, supra note 99.
102. Id at 32, 79.
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ones.' ° 3 Other unapproved comic books, however, are published by
CMAA members such as Marvel and DC. There is a major loophole in
the current Comics Code that permits CMAA members to publish comics
without the Code Seal so long as they "refrain from distributing these
publications through those distribution channels that, like the traditional
newsstand, are serviced by individuals who are unaware of the content
of specific publications before placing them on display."" The specialty
store business this provision permits is so profitable that even the
wholesome Archie Comics Group planned to release new adult titles
without the seal, until conservative pressure groups persuaded it not to
do so.
The increasing activity of such groups suggests that the next cycle of
comic book self-censorship may begin sometime soon. Although conserva-
tive organizations have recently been directing most of their rancor at
rock lyrics,' °6 comic books have drawn some criticismY°6 A few comic
stores have been successfully prosecuted for selling obscene material.
°7
As comic books become increasingly outrageous, and the weakened Code
Administrator stands by watching helplessly, many in the industry
anticipate a renewal of the anti-comics furor. This inevitably would lead
to a revival or reform of the self-censorship mechanism. "I'm always
afraid that someone's going to come down hard on this industry," Silber-
kleit acknowledges. "Back in the fifties, Kefauver and McCarthy nearly
put us out of business."
'1 8
C. TELEVISION
As the "Golden Age" of both the movies and comic books came to an
end in the early 1950s, that of television was just starting. Before long,
103. One pornographic comic book series titled Cherry, which follows the sexual
exploits of a young woman and is drawn to resemble familiar juvenile comic books like
Archie, uses a parody of the CMAA seal that reads "Condemned by the Comics Clone
Conspiracy."
104. CODE OF THE COMICS MAGAZINE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 8upra note 2.
105. See infra part I.D.
106. For example, in February 1991, the Lafayette Citizens for Decency called a news
conference in Lafayette, Indiana, to focus attention on stores selling "pornographic"
materials. Among their targets was the local branch of a national chain book store that
they alleged had sold them a graphic comic book with a plot about prostitution. UPI, BC
cycle, Feb. 16, 1991. John Fulce, a former comic book salesman, has recently been
conducting a vigorous campaign against the immorality of contemporary comics. In addition
to writing a book, published by a Christian publishing house and condemning indecent and
sacrilegious comic books, he has appeared on Christian talk shows to warn of their danger.
Michael Flagg, Wrong Kind of Funny Business?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at El.
107. See, e.g., Lisa H. Towle, What's New in the Comic Book Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1988, § 3, at 21.
108. Queenan, supra note 99.
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television was the most influential and pervasive form of mass communi-
cation in this country. In view of television's ascendancy, it is not
surprising that the same forces that pushed the other media to fashion
self-policing arrangements impelled the television industry to do the
same. From 1954 until 1984, when it dissolved the system in response
to an antitrust suit,1°9 the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
administered the Television Code.
Twenty radio stations formed the NAB in 1923 to resist demands for
royalties from the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP). During its first years, the association performed
various functions to support and promote radio. It then started to lobby
for industry interests before Congress and the FCC and to encourage
self-regulation in order to deter government censorship.
In 1929, the NAB convention approved a brief and general Code of
Ethics to prevent the airing of programs and advertisements that might
offend listeners.1 0 In 1935, in response to the hostile attitude ex-
pressed by many Congressmen toward the industry at the Communica-
tions Act Hearings of 1934,11' the NAB adopted a more specific ten-
point code.11 2 Finally, in 1939, the NAB implemented an enlarged
Radio Code, which remained in force, in various editions, until 1982.
Therefore, in 1952, when public pressure and repeated threats of specific
legislation intimidated the National Association of Radio and Television
Broadcasters (as the NAB was called from 1951 to 1958) into establish-
ing the Television Code, it not only had the motion picture Production
Code as a model but also had experience in writing and implementing a
code itself.
Like the motion picture and comic book codes, the Television Code
included restrictions on the depiction of crime, violence, sex, obscenity,
drugs and material potentially offensive to racial and religious groups.
Like the Radio Code, on the other hand, the Television Code avoided the
other codes' moralistic tone. The Television Code also regulated the
broadcast of quiz shows and exhorted certain practices in the treatment
of news. In addition, it included detailed advertising standards that
regulated the products that could be advertised, the content of commer-
cials, and the time and frequency with which they could be shown.
109. See infra pp. 469-70.
110. In 1933, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) made the 1929 NAB Code
the official law for all stations, but the Supreme Court found the NRA to be unconstitution-
al in 1935. A.LA. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
111. Hearings on the [Establishment of the] Federal Communications Commission
Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1934); Hearings on the [Establishment of the] Federal Communications Commission Before
the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
112. CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KITROS, STAY TUNED; A CONCISE HISTORY
OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 192 (1978).
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Except for during a one-year period in the mid-1970s, NAB members
were not required to subscribe to the Television Code. 11 On the other
hand, any television station, whether or not a member of the NAB, could
elect to subscribe. Overall, about two-thirds of stations did so. This figure
is deceptively low. The signatory stations accounted for a
disproportionately high percentage of television viewing in the United
States.14 Furthermore, all three networks abided by the code, and the
networks provided the majority of programming to affiliates around the
nation.
The enforcement mechanism was strikingly weak, at least on paper. A
Code Authority conducted the program. It was composed of a director,
appointed by the NAB president and board of directors, and his executive
staff. Although the Code Authority received synopses of scripts shortly
in advance of shooting time and suggested revisions, for the most part
its role was to monitor the material stations actually put on the air.
When it found what it perceived to be a violation of the Television Code,
it asked the station for an explanation. If the Code Authority was not
satisfied with the explanation, it reported the breach to a TV Code
Review Board, a body composed of representatives of code subscribers.
If the Review Board concluded that the station had indeed committed a
violation, it sent the matter to the NAB Television Board of Directors for
possible disciplinary action.
The only sanction available to the board of directors was to suspend or
withdraw the right to use the NAB Seal of Good Practice from a station
found guilty after a formal hearing. Unlike the motion picture and comic
book code authorities, which awarded a seal to each acceptable item, the
NAB Code Authority granted a seal to complying stations, and those
stations kept the seal unless they committed a "continuing, willful or
gross violation" of the Television Code. 5
Since most stations displayed the seal only twice a day -- early in the
morning right before the Star Spangled Banner and late at night
immediately after it -- the loss of the right to use it did not seem like a
very harsh penalty. Indeed, television had the least imposing enforce-
ment method of the three media that have been examined thus far.
Nonetheless, television's system of collaborative self-regulation prevented
113. From April 1976 until February 1977, all members of the NAB who operated
stations in the top 100 markets were required to observe the code as a condition of
membership. CHESTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 99.
114. In 1978, the more than 65% of stations that subscribed to the code represented
approximately 85% of all television viewing. United States v. National Assoc. of
Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D.D.C. 1982).
115. TELEVIsION CODE, quoted in id at 164 n.60. The NAB exercised its power to
revoke the seal only one time, when it expelled 30 stations from the code for showing
commercials for hemorrhoid products. All 30 were readmitted when they agreed not to show
the advertisements again.
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the dissemination of controversial material even more successfully than
the others. This apparent paradox can be explained by certain character-
istics peculiar to the medium of television.
First, television and radio enjoy less First Amendment protection than
other media. They are subject to control by the government because they
use airwaves deemed to be owned by the people. Broadcasters must
receive licenses from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
Each license lasts for only three years, and to retain its license, a
broadcaster must operate its station in the "public interest."11 6 More-
over, the Supreme Court held in 1978 that the FCC may prohibit the
broadcast of offensive material in certain circumstances, even if the
material is not legally obscene.
117
Therefore, when the FCC, the President (who nominates FCC
members) and Congress (which confirms FCC nominees and writes
legislation regulating broadcasting) threatened, as they often did, to take
action unless television "cleaned up its act," television executives were
even more inclined to adhere to their code than were the heads of other
media businesses. Broadcasters feared that if they did not adequately
censor themselves, the government would step in and enforce the
Television Code for them, and that the courts would not stop the
government from doing So.118 Furthermore, if a station were to lose its
right to display the seal, a clear signal would have been sent to the FCC
when the station applied for license renewal that the station might not
be serving the "public interest."119
A second explanation for why television stations obeyed the Television
Code's strict programming standards is that most television is supported
exclusively by advertising. 12° Advertisers like to present their products
in a noncontroversial milieu. An NAB survey showed that some
advertisers preferred to advertise on stations that displayed the seal.'
Private groups could have cut off a non-approved station's advertising
revenue simply by threatening to organize boycotts against the products
116. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1988).
117. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (Stevens, J., plurality); reh'g denied, 439 U.S.
883 (1978) (TV and radio receive less First Amendment protection because they confront
the citizen in the privacy of his home and are uniquely accessible to children).
118. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 233-34.
119. GEORGE ERIC ROSDEN & PETER ERic ROSDEN, LAW OF ADVERTISING § 41.03[1]
(1973).
120. The motion picture industry has never relied on advertising revenue. Comic books
used to sell a fair amount of advertising space (indeed, the Comics Code was intended to
control the content of advertisements as well as comics themselves), but the publishers also
made a substantial proportion of their profit from circulation. Today, comic books contain
few advertisements.
121. United States v. National Assoc. of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 164 n.61
(D.D.C. 1982).
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of its sponsors. Broadcasters thus had an additional reason to observe
the code.
As one NAB official observed, "[Tihe mere fact that we have that
power to threaten to drop people from the Code has its own inhibiting
value .... [A station] would rather not be known as someone bucking
what appears to be a good system."' 22 A member of the Code Review
Board concurred. "The moral sanctions of the Code authority are
criticized by some as being too weak, but I think there are none in this
room who would care -- or dare -- to disregard them. 1 3
There are clear similarities between the history of television self-
regulation and the history of movie and comic book self-regulation. All
three industries adopted their codes of ethics primarily to discourage
government interference. The degree to which these three industries
have complied with their respective codes has varied with the amount of
pressure imposed on them by private and governmental entities.
Because of television's special status as a highly-regulated communica-
tions industry, the pressure on television broadcasters has been particu-
larly intense. Congress has always been willing to assume the politically
popular task of purifying the people's airwaves. Although Congress
occasionally has used hearings to expose the moral danger of motion
pictures and comic books, these industries have been fortunate compared
to television broadcasters, whom Congress has subjected to highly
publicized hearings every few years.' 2
In 1952, 1954 and 1955, Senator Kefauver's Subcommittee to Investi-
gate Juvenile Delinquency, the same body that held the comic book
hearings, hosted hearings to examine the effects of televised violence on
youth.125 From 1961 through 1964, the subcommittee, then under
Senator Thomas Dodd, held additional hearings on the subject. In 1964,
in its interim report, the subcommittee recommended adding sanctions
to the NAB Code and impliedly threatened Congressional action if the
industry did not regulate its violent programming more diligently. The
limited distribution of the interim report and the subcommittee's failure
to issue a final report, however, limited the impact of these hearings."
Senator John Pastore succeeded Dodd as the chief political enemy of
television violence. He was chairman of the Communications Subcommit-
tee of the Senate Commerce Committee. Beginning in 1969, he held
122. Id- at 164.
123. Writers Guild of America, West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated sub nom. Writers Guild of America, West v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
124. Id. at 1095 n.35.
125. The experts who testified at these hearings expressed widely varying opinions on
the contributions of television violence to juvenile delinquency. STERLING & KirrRos, supra
note 112, at 419.
126. Id at 420.
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hearings on the link between television violence and crime at least once
a year. He also opposed much of the religious and political satire and the
sexually suggestive material that appeared on television.' 27 In 1969,
his disappointment with the industry's failure to police itself adequately
led him to propose that the NAB's Code Authority begin to censor
entertainment programs before they were released. In exchange, he
would promote legislation to assure the security of broadcast licens-
es. 
1 28
NBC and ABC agreed to cooperate, but CBS refused, asserting that it
could not "accede to a proposal which would [make the NAB Television
Code Authority] the single final arbiter of network television entertain-
ment that the American people would be permitted to see."12 The
agreement fell through.
Nevertheless, Pastore's pressure influenced television programming.
The NAB was not the sole censor in the television industry. Each
network had its own department of standards and practices. In the same
letter in which he turned down Pastore's proposal, CBS's president also
promised to "intensify our efforts to improve the program standards of
the CBS television network."13° Indeed, less than two weeks later,
CBS's Program Practices Department rejected several segments in the
controversial Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour, and the network
subsequently canceled the show and fired the Smothers for their failure
to deliver an acceptable tape on time.
13 1
On other occasions, the government was able to pressure the NAB into
revising its code. In 1974, a group called Action for Children's Television
(ACT) persuaded the FCC to take steps to limit the amount of advertis-
ing on children's television programs. FCC Chairman Richard Wiley
warned broadcasters that if they did not take action, the FCC would.
132
The next month, the NAB Code adopted a rule limiting advertisements
targeted at children. Soon thereafter, the FCC announced that it would
not pass a rule on the matter because "the standards adopted by the
[NAB] are comparable to the standards which we would have considered
adopting by rule in absence of industry reform."1"
127. Among the broadcasts he disfavored were Laugh-In, The Smothers Brothers
Comedy Hour, and a Noxema shaving cream commercial where a woman begs a man who
is shaving to "take it all off." GEOFFREY COWAN, SEE No EVIL 54 (1979).
128. Id. at 55.
129. Letter from Frank Stanton, President of CBS, to Senator Pastore (Mar. 22, 1969),
quoted in id. at 55-56.
130. Id. at 57.
131. Id. at 51-53.
132. The NAB had good reason to take such government threats seriously; when the
NAB had resisted pressure to regulate cigarette advertising in the late 1960s, Congress
responded with legislation completely banning such advertisements from television and
radio. Id. at 105.
133. Id. at 91-92.
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The same year, Wiley and the FCC strong-armed the NAB into adding
a "family viewing policy" to its code. This new rule, better known as the
"family hour," enjoined the airing of "entertainment programming
inappropriate for children" between 7:00 P.M. and 9:00 P.M. (between
6:00 P.M. and 8:00 P.M. in the Central Time Zone).' 34 Wiley's efforts
were motivated by the opposition of many private groups and govern-
ment officials to the broadcast of programs with adult themes, such as
All in the Family, during the early evening hours, when youngsters were
likely to watch them. For months, in speeches, interviews, and meetings
with network officials, Wiley warned that if the NAB did not do
something constructive about this issue, the FCC would be compelled to
take action. In April 1975, the NAB capitulated and added the family
viewing policy to the Television Code by amendment.1 35
In 1976, a group of creators, writers and producers of network TV
programs challenged the policy in federal district court in California.
They based their claims on the First Amendment and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).136 Because neither the First Amendment nor the
APA governs purely private activity, the plaintiffs had to persuade the
court that the pressure exerted by Wiley and the FCC converted the
NAB's adoption of the policy into state action.
The court accepted this position in Writers Guild of America, West v.
FCC.137 The court found that the networks, the NAB and the FCC had
participated in an "unprecedented joint venture" and that the "threat of
regulatory action was... a crucial, necessary, and indispensable cause"
of the NAB's implementation of the policy.1' It thus held that the
establishment of the family hour constituted state action violative of the
First Amendment and the APA. Relying on Bantam Books v. Sulli-
van,13 a Supreme Court decision, Judge Warren Ferguson wrote, "If
the First Amendment means anything,.... the Commission has no right
to accompany its suggestions with vague or explicit threats of regulatory
134. The amendment read:
[E]ntertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by a general family
audience should not be broadcast during the first hour of network entertainment
programming in prime time and in the immediately preceding hour. In the
occasional case when an entertainment program in this time period is deemed to
be inappropriate for such an audience, advisories should be used to alert viewers.
Writers Guild of America, West v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355, 357 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1979).
135. Id.
136. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988).
137. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
138. Id. at 1094.
139. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
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action should broadcasters consider and reject [its suggestions]. 1 40 The
decision compelled the NAB to stop enforcing the family viewing policy.
Although the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment on jurisdictional
grounds in 1979,141 the NAB never reintroduced the policy.
142
The principle of Bantam Books and Writers Guild remains an
important potential weapon for opponents of censorship by "voluntary"
industry codes. Although the government rarely coerces self-regulation
so actively and so clearly as the FCC did in this case, if a plaintiff can
establish that a media industry would not have instituted a self-
censorship system but for government pressure, he may be able to
persuade a court to strike down the system if it does not satisfy First
Amendment requirements. Every self-censorship arrangement we have
examined so far would almost certainly violate the First Amendment
because of vagueness, overbreadth and lack of procedural due pro-
cess.
143
The legal arrow that finally felled the Television Code was aimed not
at its suppression of speech, but at its other Achilles' heel, its anti-
competitive effects. In 1979, the Justice Department brought an action
against the NAB, charging that several of the Television Code's
commercial time restrictions violated antitrust laws. Specifically, the
Government asserted that code provisions that limited the minutes per
hour that could be devoted to commercials, the number of commercials
140. 432 F. Supp. at 1150. In Bantam Books, the Rhode Island Legislature created a
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth. The Commission reviewed books and
magazines and composed lists of those that were inappropriate for minors. The commission
then sent the lists to booksellers, accompanied by notices which asked for "cooperation" and
advised the booksellers that the lists were circulated to local police departments and that
the commission would "recommend prosecution of purveyors of obscenity." 372 U.S. at 58.
The Supreme Court held that this arrangement violated the First Amendment. It noted
that "compliance with the Commission's directives was not voluntary. People do not lightly
regard public officers' thinly veiled threats to institute criminal proceedings against them
if they do not come around." Id. at 68. The Court further observed that
though the Commission is limited to informal sanctions -the threat of invoking
legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation -... the
Commission deliberately set about to achieve the suppression of publications
deemed 'objectionable' and succeeded in its aim. We are not the first court to look
through forms to the substance and recognize that informal censorship may suffi-
ciently inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief.
Id. at 67. Since the FCC itself has formal power to control broadcasting, its actions in the
Writers Guild case were, if anything, a clearer First Amendment violation than the Rhode
Island commission's pressure in Bantam Books.
141. Writers Guild of America, West v. American Broadcasting Co., 609 F.2d 355 (9th
Cir. 1979).
142. After years of litigation complicated by jurisdictional issues, all of the parties in
the case agreed to a settlement in 1984.
143. A number of articles have convincingly demonstrated that the MPAA rating
system would contravene the First Amendment if it were state action. See Bates, supra
note 33; Friedman, supra note 30.
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per each program interruption, and the number of products that could
be advertised in a single commercial violated the Sherman Act."' Both
parties moved for summary judgment. In United States v. National
Association of Broadcasters, the federal district court held:
The NAB Code is an agreement among competing television networks
and stations, and it restricts the availability of one of the principal
services these competitors offer -- the broadcasting of commercial
announcements. As such, it is the classical agreement which the Sher-
man Act was designated to reach.""
The court decided that the "Rule of Reason 146 applied to the provisions
that limited the time and number of advertisements, and that a trial was
therefore necessary to settle the dispositive questions of fact. 147 On the
other hand, the court found the multiple product limitation to be a per
se violation of the Sherman Act and granted summary judgment for the
government. 14
In November 1982, while an appeal was pending, the Justice Depart-
ment and the NAB negotiated a consent decree ending the litigation. In
the decree, the NAB agreed to stop enforcing all rules respecting the
quantity, placement or format of advertising. Soon afterward the NAB,
worried that the remainder of the Television Code might also be
vulnerable to antitrust attacks, dissolved the Code Board of Directors
and officially terminated the remaining functions of the Code and Code
Authority. The Television Code was dead. 49
The Supreme Court has never decided an antitrust case involving a
media code. It thus remains unclear whether an antitrust suit challeng-
ing a self-censorship arrangement could ultimately succeed, particularly
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1991). The Act states, "[e]very contract, combination..., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.. . is declared to
be illegal."
145. 536 F. Supp. 149, 163 (D.D.C. 1982).
146. The Rule of Reason derives from Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
58 (1911), which supported the proposition that the Sherman Act applies to agreements
which are "unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions." As the doctrine is applied
now, cases are evaluated under the Rule of Reason if their "competitive effect can only be
evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and
the reasons why it was imposed." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
147. National Assoc. of Broadcasterm, 536 F. Supp. at 152.
148. Id Per se violations are "agreements whose nature and necessary effects are so
plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their
illegality." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
149. The NAB dropped the Radio Code, as well.
470
if the arrangement regulated only noncommercial content.15" For now,
the Sherman Act survives as a potential weapon against collaborative
self-regulation by the media.
The dissolution of the Television Code did not quickly result in
dramatic changes in American television. The networks' departments of
standards and practices and individual station managers were still
worried enough about government interference to keep much potentially
offensive material off the screen. Still, as the 1980s progressed, the
combination of the lack of a code and the rise of cable television did lead
to some subtle changes, such as a generally more relaxed attitude about
the presentation of sexual themes, as well as some very concrete
changes, such as the introduction of advertisements for contraceptives.
Many Americans, and hence many politicians, are concerned about this
state of affairs. Consequently, it appears that television's next round of
self-censorship may be about to begin. FCC chairman Alfred Sikes is
urging the introduction of a new code, as are many members of Con-
gress.151 In December 1990, Congress passed the "Television Program
Improvement Act," which eliminates the antitrust obstacle potentially
raised by United States v. NAB 152 by granting an antitrust exemption
to organizations in the television industry, so they might develop "volun-
tary guidelines designed to alleviate the negative impact of violence in
telecast material."'1 3
The opportunity thus exists for the NAB to implement a new television
code regulating violent broadcasts. Nonetheless, the NAB insists that it
has no plans to do so.154 The association cites First Amendment con-
cerns, but it is also likely troubled by the networks' declining market
share.
Government pressure may well eventually compel the industry to adopt
a new television code. The FCC is attempting to expand its current 16-
hour (6:00 a.m - 10:00 p.m.) ban on "indecent" radio and television broad-
150. At least one other federal district court has considered the issue. In 1970, the
producer of the film Tropic of Cancer filed an antitrust suit for a preliminary injunction
against the MPAA, alleging that the rating system, which had designated his movie as X-
rated, was a conspiracy in constraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The district
court turned down the plaintiffs request for an injunction because he did not adequately
establish that he would succeed on the merits or be irreparably damaged by his failure to
secure an injunction. The court did not reach the merits themselves. Tropic Film v.
Paramount Pictures, 319 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
151. Broadcasters Reconsider Voluntary Program Code, BROADCASTING, Oct. 2, 1989,
at 50.
152. 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982).
153. Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5127
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1991)).
154. Telephone Interview with Walter Wurfel, Senior Vice President of Public Affairs
at NAB (July 1, 1991).
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casts to 24 hours."s Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia struck down the 24-hour ban as violative of the First
Amendment in May 1991,1m the FCC is attempting to have that
holding reversed. If it succeeds, broadcasters may attempt to ward off
such government censorship by reestablishing a code."'7 Television may
well be stuck in a repeating cycle of self-censorship for as long as it
remains a highly regulated industry.'58
D. ROCK MUSIC
The history of the collaborative self-censorship of rock lyrics by the
record industry is brief, because it began only within the last decade.
Rock music is probably the most controversial modern art form. The
phrase "rock and roll" itself is a sexual euphemism.'w Rock is full of
sexual language, violent images, anti-authoritarian themes and stinging
political commentary. Songs occasionally contain vicious bigotry, satanic
references and mysterious backwards messages. Until fairly recently,
rock was a phenomenon experienced almost exclusively by youth and was
thus inaccessible and threatening to the older generations who held
power. Furthermore, the fact that African-Americans were largely
responsible for inventing rock and roll and continue to be among its most
prominent composers and performers has disturbed many Americans
with racist tendencies.
It is therefore not surprising that rock and roll has been the target of
censorship efforts almost from the time it emerged in the 1950s.' 60
155. Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency, 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3999 (1990). The FCC defines indecent programming as material that "describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs." Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d
94, 98 (1975).
156. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (1991).
157. The Television Program Improvement Act would not erase antitrust problems with
a code regulating "indecent" programming, for the act pertains only to agreements about
violent broadcasts, whereas the FCC's notion of "indecent" material concerns "sexual or
excretory activities or organs." 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (Supp. 1991).
158. On March 2, 1992, as this article went to press, the Supreme Court denied
petitions for certiorari. FCC v. Action for Children's Television, No. 91-952, 1992 U.S.
LEXIS 1420 (Mar. 2, 1992). For an anaylsis of the consequences of this decision, see Guy
Reiss, Indecent Speech on the Air, the Federal Communications Commission and the First
Amendment: An Update, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 435 (1991).
Chairman Sikes declared that the FCC would "continue to enforce our rules concerning
indecent broadcasts to the extent permitted by law." Reuters, AM Cycle, Mar. 2, 1992.
159. John Morthland, Rock 'N' Roll Feels the Fire, HIGH FIDELITY, Dec. 1985, at 74.
160. There are many well-known examples of private and governmental censorship of
rock music. In 1956, Asa Carter, the executive secretary of the North Alabama White
Citizen's Council, initiated a purge of rock from jukeboxes because the NAACP had
"infiltrated" white teens with rock and roll. In order for his group, the Rolling Stones, to
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Nevertheless, anti-rock forces did not attempt to force a self-policing
system on the music industry until the 1980s. Why was this so, given the
ready examples provided by the movie, comic book and television codes?
Perhaps it was because such an arrangement did not seem particularly
appropriate for this medium. Whereas the number of motion pictures,
comic books and television programs released each year is fairly limited,
there are literally tens of thousands of songs. The size of the task of a
record industry code authority would dwarf that of the other industries'
self-policing organizations. Furthermore, music is divided into more
diverse genres than the other media. Few people were interested in
censoring Verdi or Cole Porter, but, given the blurry distinctions between
different types of music, it would be difficult to design a code that would
clean up Sergeant Pepper without disturbing Lieutenant Kij6.
Despite these difficulties, in the early 1980s several organizations
started to campaign for a formal system of self-regulation in the record
industry.161 In 1983, the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA)
called on the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) to rate
records and to require its members to display lyrics on album covers. The
RIAA completely ignored these demands.
In spring of 1985, an organization called the Parents' Music Resource
Center (PMRC) took up the battle. Although the PMRC was composed
entirely of private citizens, it would be somewhat misleading to call it a
private organization. It was widely known as "The Washington Wives"
because seventeen of its original twenty members were married to some
of Washington's most powerful politicians. One writer wryly observed
that "half of them are married to ten percent of the Senate."162 The co-
chairwomen of the PMRC were Susan Baker, the wife of Treasury
Secretary James Baker, and Tipper Gore, the wife of Senator Albert
Gore.
Because of the familial connections of its members, the PMRC received
an inordinate amount of attention from the press. They used their free
air time and newspaper space to lambaste rock for promoting free love,
sadomasochism, rebellion, the occult and drugs to America's children.
Their principal targets were black artists, such as Prince, and heavy
appear on the Ed Sullivan Show, Mick Jagger had to change the words "Let's Spend the
Night Together" to "Let's Spend Some Time Together." (What he in fact sang was an
incomprehensible mumble.) The FCC held an investigation to determine the lyrics of the
Kingsmen's unintelligible song "Louie, Louie." In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Vice
President Spiro Agnew conducted a spirited campaign against rock lyrics about drugs. He
warned that the FCC might take away radio stations' licenses if they played songs
containing such lyrics. See LINDA MARTIN & KERRY SEGRAVE, ANTI-ROCK, THE OPPOSITION
TO ROCK 'N' ROLL (1988).
161. The National Music Review Organization promoted the use of a seal of approval.
Jesse Jackson's PUSH advocated a ratings system. Cecelie Berry & David Wolin, Comment,
Regulating Rock Lyrics: A New Wave of Censorship?, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 595, 596 (1986).
162. MARTIN & SEGRAVE, supra note 160, at 292.
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metal groups, such as Judas Priest. They also accused Madonna, a white
pop singer, of teaching young girls "how to be a porn queen in heat.t 163
In May 1985, the PMRC sent a letter to the RIAA that suggested,
among other things, that the latter organization establish a ratings
board composed of producers, songwriters, disc jockeys and community
representatives to classify records. Objectionable records would receive
one of four ratings: "X" for sexual explicitness, "0" for occultism, "D/A"
for drugs and alcohol and "V" for violence. 16 8 Record companies would
be required to label their albums with the ratings, and the PMRC would
pressure radio stations not to play X, D/A, 0 or V songs.
Stanley Gortikov, the president of the RIAA, sent the PMRC a response
in which he firmly rejected the proposal on behalf of his
organization. 165 He did, however, inform the Washington Wives that
nineteen of the RIAA's fourty-four member companies had agreed to put
warning stickers on albums of a violent or sexual nature at their own
discretion." The labels would read something like "Parental Guidance
- Explicit Lyrics."
6 7
It was a very limited concession. Still, some artists and civil libertari-
ans were upset that the industry had "caved in." The fact that it took the
PMRC only three months to win a concession that the national PTA had
been unable to win after two years of pressure demonstrated how the
PMRC's governmental connections had intimidated the industry. Susan
Baker acknowledged, "Our connections certainly helped, no doubt about
it. 1
68
There are a number of reasons why the record industry was susceptible
to such quasi-governmental pressure, despite the protection afforded it
by the First Amendment. First, the Ginsberg'69 and Interstate Cir-
cuit17° cases still held open the possibility of a government-enforced
classification system to protect children. If the RIAA had ignored the
PMRC's proposal that it rate its own records, the Washington Wives
'might have persuaded their husbands to do the rating.
163. Id. at 293.
164. The proposed system, with its descriptive classifications, was much like ones that
many people have suggested the MPAA adopt for films. See, e.g., Hal Hinson, The 20-Year
Rating Game: MPAA's Film Review System Still Spurs Debate OverArtistic Freedom, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 1988, at G1 (President of California PTA favors subheadings such as PG-V
for violence or PG-S for sex); Jack Mathews, Change in Film Ratings Favored, Parents
Want More Details; Producers Want Status Quo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1987, § 6, at 1 (Poll
shows that 73% of American adults would favor adding additional codes -- V for violence,
S for sex and L for language -- to the ratings to reflect movies' contents).
165. MARTIN & SEGRAVE, supra note 160, at 296.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Morthland, supra note 159, at 75.
169. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
170. Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
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Second, the financial success of the recording industry depended on its
ability to have its product broadcast on the radio airwaves, and those
airwaves were regulated by Congress and the FCC. Nat Hentoff, a civil
libertarian journalist, observed:
[I]f the record industry doesn't do what the Washington wives want it to,
the Senate Commerce Committee is likely to be asked to save the
children of the nation by setting up regulations and statutes as to the
kinds of rock language that can no longer be permitted, especially on the
air.1
n
Finally, the music industry did not want to displease the federal
government, because it often needed the government's help. For example,
the RIAA frequently asked the FBI and other federal agencies for
assistance in enforcing copyright and counterfeit laws. Furthermore, in
1985, Congress was considering an anti-piracy bill that the RIAA had
drafted. This "Home Audio Recording Bill"172 would have assessed a
surtax on the sale of tape recorders and blank cassette tapes to
reimburse record companies and music publishers for the money they
lost to unauthorized duplication of their products. The RIAA was
consequently wary of spurning the PMRC. Gortikov informed the RIAA
member companies that he could not "escape continuing dialogue with
this group," because ignoring the Washington Wives might "jeopardize[]"
the anti-piracy bill. 78
The PMRC was dissatisfied with the RIAA's concession and with the
record companies' spotty compliance with it.174 Some warning labels
appeared, but not many, and a few RIAA companies publicly denounced
the use of the labels and joined the Musical Majority, an anti-censorship
organization. The PMRC formed a coalition with the National PTA and
announced a modified set of demands. It no longer required a permanent
ratings board and four descriptive classifications. Instead, it wanted the
record companies to put an all-purpose "R" rating, similar to the
corresponding MPAA classification, on explicit records, according to
guidelines established by a one-time panel. The PMRC also demanded
that the industry make printed lyrics available to customers before pur-
chase. 175
The Washington Wives then proceeded to justify all the fears Gortikov
and the RIAA had about their governmental connections. On September
19, 1985, the Senate Commerce, Technology, and Transportation
171. Nat Hentoff, The Disc Washers, PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1985, at 29.
172. H.R 2911, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
173. Morthland, supra note 159, at 75.
174. I& at 88.
175. See MARTIN & SEGRAVE, supra note 160, at 298.
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Committee held a highly publicized hearing on rock lyrics. 76 Senator
Albert Gore, Tipper's husband, was a member of the Committee, and
Senator John Danforth, whose wife was connected with the PMRC, was
the chairman. Tipper Gore claimed that her organization did not request
the hearings. However, when asked if Senator Gore had anything to do
with setting up the hearing, a staff member of the Commerce Committee
responded, "You must know that the Senator's wife is a leader of the
Parents' Music Resource Center."
77
The goal of the rock music hearings was the same as that of the movie,
comic book and television hearings before it -- to expose the medium's
corrupting influence to the nation and browbeat the industry into
policing itself. Probably to guarantee publicity, the Committee invited
pop culture heroes John Denver, Frank Zappa and Dee Snyder to testify.
Their presence transformed the session into the event of the year on
Capitol Hill. Photographs of Snyder, a member of the heavy-metal group
Twisted Sister, testifying before the Committee in his outrageous stage
regalia appeared in newspapers and magazines around the country. 7 1
Much of the hearing was devoted to debate over the PMRC proposal.
Susan Baker testified on behalf of the PMRC. All three musicians spoke
out against rating records. Zappa, an avant-garde rock musician and
composer, asserted that "the complete list of PMRC demands reads like
an instruction manual for some sinister kind of toilet-training program
to housebreak all composers and performers. ' 79
As in past hearings concerning other media, senators attempted
through threats of government intervention to intimidate the record
industry into censoring itself. Danforth stated that the government was
not contemplating legislation. On the other hand, Senator James Exon
warned, "unless the music industry cleans up their [sic] act.., there is
likely to be legislation."''8 Senator Ernest Hollings announced, "I will
be looking from the Senator's standpoint ... to try to see if there is ...
an approach that can be used by the Congress to limit this outrageous
filth, suggestive violence, suicide, and everything else in the Lord's world
that you would not think of."' 8' 1 He added, "If I could find some way
constitutionally to do away with it, I would. 1 8 2
The hearing was not an unqualified success for the PMRC. The singers'
comments were arguably more eloquent and persuasive and unquestion-
176. Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United
States Senate, on the Contents of Music and the Lyrics of Records, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
[hereinafter Hearing] (1985).
177. Hentoff, supra note 171.
178. See, e.g., Newsmakers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1985, at 80.
179. Hearing supra note 176, at 53.
180. Id. at 60.
181. Id. at 2.
182. Id.
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ably more publicized than those of Baker and the senators sympathetic
to her cause. Nevertheless, the hearing did focus a great deal of
unfavorable public attention on the controversial lyrics of some rock
songs. The industry decided to sue for peace.
On November 1, 1985, the RIAA, PMRC and PTA announced a new
accord. Under this agreement, whenever a company distributed a record
with explicit references to sex, violence or substance abuse, it would have
two options. It could attach a warning sticker to the album stating
"Explicit Lyrics - Parental Advisory." Alternatively, it could print the
lyrics on the back of the album or on a lyric sheet inserted under the
plastic wrap.183 Of the RIAA's fourty-four companies, twenty-two,
representing more than 80/ of American music sales, agreed to the
plan.18
It was undoubtedly one of the weakest collaborative self-censorship
arrangements in the history of American media. There was no code and
no industry-wide ratings board. Each company established its own
criteria about what constituted explicit lyrics. In fact, it was not until
May 1986 that a record company finally labelled a record. 8s After that,
only the most brutally violent and crudely sexual albums received labels.
Like other ineffective self-policing systems, such as the 1930 Motion
Picture Production Code (administered by a "studio relations commit-
tee")18 and the 1948 Comics Code (administered by the Association of
Comics Magazine Publishers), 87 the 1985 record labeling agreement
quieted the controversy only until people became aware that it was not
accomplishing much. Compliance increased somewhat over time,188 but
the wording of the warning stickers varied, and they were often
coordinated with the cover designs of the albums, limiting their visibility.
Furthermore, although some major record chains refused to carry albums
with warning stickers, or refused to sell them to minors, a sticker did not
seem substantially to reduce an album's profitability or deter its production.'8
183. Since the lyrics to all of the songs on an album could not fit on the small container
of a cassette tape, the agreement provided that cassettes with explicit songs could be tagged
with a sticker advising "See LP for lyrics." MARTIN & SECRAVE, supra note 160, at 306.
184. Id.
185. The first album to receive a warning label was Love on the Beat, by a French
artist named Serge Gainsbourg. The label read, "Explicit French Lyrics: Parental Advisory."
186. See supra part I.A.2.
187. See supra part I.B.
188. The general manager of Tower Records in Boston said in April 1990 that 35-400 h
of rap albums are labeled with warnings. Kevin Cullen, When Public Enemy Raps, Many
Hub Youths Get the Message, B. GLOBE, Apr. 11, 1990, at 30.
189. Among the chains that discontinued selling records with warning labels to anyone
under 18 were Trans World Corp., Wax WorkE/Disk Jockey and Musicland. Chuck Philips,
Record Industry Unveils Warning Label; Advisory: Logo Warns Consumers, Parents of
Potentially Offensive Lyrics, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Fl.
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In 1989 and 1990, articles about violent pornographic and satanic rock
began appearing frequently in major publications again. 19° The main
targets were rap and heavy metal music. By early 1990, legislators in
almost twenty states were trying to restrict the sale of explicitly sexual
or graphically violent records.1 9'
To discourage states from imposing their own warning label require-
ments, the RIAA announced, in March 1990, that all of its companies
would apply uniform, highly visible stickers, each with the same size,
design, wording and placement, on explicit albums. In May 1990, the
RIAA unveiled the new logo, a black and white label reading "Parental
Advisory -- Explicit Lyrics."19 According to the agreement, individual
record companies would continue to decide for themselves which albums
would receive warning stickers. There were no guidelines, and no outside
panel would review the companies' decisions.'9
The RIAA's promise to institute a uniform labeling system placated
many lawmakers. By the time the RIAA unveiled the new sticker in
May, sixteen of the nineteen state legislatures considering statutes
requiring warning labels had already ceased their efforts to pass
them. 9' Moreover, the PMRC supported the new logo.' 95 Nonethe-
less, a series of events over the next two months demonstrated that
critics of explicit rock lyrics would continue to pressure the industry. On
June 6, a federal district judge in Florida found As Nasty as They Wanna
Be, an album by the rap group 2 Live Crew, to be obscene.'96 Two days
later, George Freeman, the owner of a Florida record store, was arrested
According to USA Today, "Record store labeling has had no effect on sales." Jefferson
Graham, Stores Limit Sales of Some Rap LP's, USA TODAY, June 23, 1989, at 1D. Some
guessed that the stickers actually increased sales. Holly Cass, the executive director of the
National Association of Independent Record Distributors and Manufacturers, noted, "The
stickers could make these albums forbidden fruit, very desirable." Jon Pareles, Record
Companies to Put Warnings on the Raw, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at C17. Indeed, 2 Live
Crew's stickered song, Nasty as They Wanna Be, sold nine times more than their cleaned-up
version of the song, Clean as They Want to Be. Amy Duncan, Will Voluntary Labeling
Work?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 24, 1990, at Arts 15.
190. See, e.g., Stuart Goldman, That Old Devil Music, NATL REV., Feb. 24, 1989, at 28
(cover story); Jerry Adler & Jennifer Foote, The Rap Attitude, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 1990,
at 56; John Leo, Rock 'n'Roll's Hatemongering, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 19, 1990,
at 17; Richard Corliss, X Rated, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 92.
191. Recording Industry Shows Its New Warning Label, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at
C16.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Philips, supra note 189.
196. Skyywalker Records v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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for selling the album.197 Two days after Freeman's arrest, three mem-
bers of 2 Live Crew were arrested after an adults-only concert in
Hollywood, Florida. In addition, on July 7, the Louisiana Legislature
passed the nation's first bill mandating that record manufacturers place
warning labels on albums with potentially offensive lyrics.
198
By the end of 1990, the record industry had some reason to be
optimistic. In October, a jury acquitted the members of 2 Live Crew. 190
Freeman was convicted, 20° but Texas judges dismissed similar obsceni-
ty charges against a San Antonio record-store owner and the Dallas-
based Sound Warehouse chain.20' And Governor Buddy Roemer of
Louisiana vetoed the state record labeling bill, asserting that it was
unconstitutional. 2
Nonetheless, the story of self-regulation by the record industry is
almost certainly not finished. In the spring of 1991, Jay Berman, the
head of the RIAA, asserted, "[A]nyone who thinks the pop music
obscenity battle is over ought to think again." ° The Freeman convic-
tion, if ultimately upheld, will probably have a chilling effect on the
entire music industry.2°4 Moreover, by June 1991, thirteen state
legislatures were once again considering bills requiring warning labels
on album covers. 2°5 Pressure groups and government officials striving
to mandate warning stickers will gain support if rock music continues to
become increasingly vulgar, violent, misogynistic, homophobic and
racist." If the threat of government censorship builds, the record
industry likely will be coerced into formulating a more effective self-
policing mechanism.
197. In addition to Charles Freeman, at least four other record-store employees around
the country were arrested for selling the album. Jon Pareles, Store Owner Convicted of
Obscenity in Album Sale, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1990, at A18.
198. Jon Pareles, Louisiana Bill Would Require Warning on Recordings, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 1990, at A16.
199. Sara Rimer, Rap Band Members Found Not Guilty in Obscenity Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1990, at Al.
200. Pareles, supra note 197.
201. Chuck Philips, Case Dismissed Against Texas Record Seller, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11,
1990, at Fl; Chuck Philips, Judge Fines "Nasty" Album Seller $1,000, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 13,
1990, at Fl.
202. Frances F. Marcus, Label Bill is Vetoed in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1990,
at C17.
203. Chuck Philips, Pop Music: A War that Isn't Over, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991,
Calendar, at 8.
204. Janice Heller, Rap Groups Appeal; Show-Biz Forces Rally for 2 Live Crew, LEGAL
TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1991, at 12.
205. Joel Selvin, Rock Newsletter Gives 7Up a Thumbs Down, S.F. CHRoN., June 9,
1991, Sunday Datebook, at 49. See also Philips, supra note 203 (summarizing legislative
proposals in a number of states).
206. See Adler & Foote, supra note 190.
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The degree to which that system will curb expression will depend
largely on the amount of potential and actual power that government
wields over the industry.2°7 The case histories this article has exam-
ined clearly demonstrate this fact. But the specific characteristics of the
self-censorship arrangement will also help determine its potency. The
next section will examine the various structural choices an industry
makes when it constructs a self-regulatory system and the effects those
choices have on the tendency of that system to suppress artistic expres-
sion.
II. SYSTEMS OF CENSORSHIP.
THE CRITICAL COMPONENTS
As the four case studies illustrate, the extent to which an industry's
self-censorship system curbs expression depends largely on the amount
of pressure that the government exerts to coerce compliance. On the
other hand, the specific features of such a system also help to determine
its effectiveness. Indeed, pressure groups and government officials often
browbeat a media industry not only into policing itself but also into
policing itself in a certain way that they believe will most efficiently
prevent the dissemination of offensive material.
This section will discuss three sets of alternative features of media self-
censorship arrangements. The effectiveness of a given arrangement
hinges to a large degree on the particular features it possesses. First, a
self-censorship mechanism may employ a mandatory seal of approval, it
may classify material in a way that limits juvenile access, or it may use
purely advisory ratings. Second, the producers or distributors of the
medium may be the only parties to the self-censorship agreement, or the
purveyors of that medium may participate as well. Third, the material
may be evaluated by the individual companies who produce or distribute
it, by a body composed of industry representatives, or by a group of
outsiders.
A. SEAL OF APPROVAL VS. RESTRICTIVE CLASSIFICATION
VS. ADVISORY RATINGS
Almost all groups that campaign for media self-regulation say that
their primary goal is to protect children. Parents have the right, as well
as the responsibility, to control what their children read, listen to and
watch. Any arrangement that limits parents' discretion to perform this
207. Because of its dependence on radio, which is highly regulated, the record industry
is quite vulnerable to indirect government pressure. The federal government, through the
FCC, should be able to coerce the RIAA into adopting a much stricter self-censorship
mechanism than the one it has now.
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task is troubling. Even more troubling, however, is a system that, in the
process of sheltering youth, violates the free speech rights of adults as
well. Unfortunately, those who are concerned with saving other people's
children from contamination usually do not mind if adults also happen
to be denied access to controversial images, words and ideas.
There is no major medium in this country that caters only to youth, or
even primarily to youth. Adults twenty years old or older purchase more
than two-thirds of the rock records sold in this country.2 °" Even comic
books, seemingly the most juvenile of all media, have a readership
composed largely of adults." It is therefore imperative, from a free
speech perspective, that a system of self-regulation not protect children
by preventing the release of all material that is not suitable for them. As
Justice Brennan said in Jacobellis:
We recognize the legitimate and indeed exigent interest... in prevent-
ing the dissemination of material deemed harmful to children. But that
interest does not justify a total suppression of such material, the effect
of which would be to "reduce the adult population ... to reading only
what is fit for children."
21 0
All self-regulation by the media limits the expression available to
adults to some degree. But the three basic forms of self-regulation --
seals-of-approval, restrictive classification and advisory ratings -- do not
all infringe on the free speech rights of adults the same amount.
The seal of approval is the least precise method for protecting the
welfare of children. The Motion Picture Production Code and the Comics
Code prohibited the distribution of any item that had not received a seal
from the code authority. In other words, these systems were designed to
check completely the dissemination of objectionable material, even if the
material was objectionable only to children. A creator or distributor
whose product failed to receive the seal had to expurgate his product to
satisfy the industry censors. If he did not, the film or comic book would
never reach an audience.
208. According to RIAA statistics, in 1984, children between the ages of 10 and 14
bought only 9 O/o f rock records, children 15 to 19 bought 220/, and people over 20 purchased
the rest. Berry & Wolin, supra note 161, at 606.
209. In 1955, just as the Comics Code was taking effect, the New York Times reported
that 25 million children and 75 million adults read some comics every day. Inflation Barred
as Aid to Jobless, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1955, at 83. The ratio today is likely even more
heavily skewed towards adults because of the recent proliferation of comic books designed
specifically for older readers.
210. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380, 383 (1957)). See also Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963) (even if statute
does not explicitly ban material from adults, it may be void if it has the practical effect of
prohibiting access to adults).
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The NAB used its Seal of Good Practice differently, but not in a way
that protected the interests of adults. The Television Code was not, like
the comic book and motion picture codes, a form of prior censorship. The
NAB review board did not pre-approve material. Instead, it continuously
monitored each network's and each station's programming. TV stations
had the right to display the seal so long as they were not in "continuing,
willful or gross violation" of the Television Code.2 Stations endeavored
not to lose the seal because such a loss would send a negative message
to both the FCC and advertisers. Therefore, TV stations and networks
often refused to accept controversial shows from producers. Furthermore,
writers and producers often censored themselves in order to ensure that
stations would televise their products. The NAB's use of its Seal of Good
Practice thus kept virtually all programming and advertisements with
adult themes off the air.
212
Unlike self-regulation systems that use a seal of approval, restrictive
classification systems, while preventing children from having access to
certain materials, also attempt to protect the rights of adults. The MPAA
ratings program is such a system. The PG-13, R and NC-17 ratings
inform parents about the suitability of films for minors and restrict
children's access to films containing mature language and themes, but
they are not intended in any way to interfere with adults' ability to see
motion pictures.213 Some civil libertarians feel that the NC-17 rating
(formerly X) abridges the rights of parents by denying them the
unlimited discretion to decide what movies their children can see and the
rights of children by preventing them from seeing movies that their
parents might otherwise allow them to see.214 But for the most part,
Americans view the ratings as helpful and harmless. 5
Before the MPAA replaced the X rating with NC-17 in 1990, however,
it became clear that the MPAA ratings program did more than prevent
youngsters from seeing adult films. In fact, it forced the creators of many
films to alter their product and prevented some films from ever being
made at all.
211. TELEVISION CODE, supra note 115.
212. Geoffrey Cowan noted that prior to the end of the 1960s, television "seldom
contained material that was explosive or controversial. Political issues, religion, sex, indeed
the real world, rarely appeared." COWAN, supra note 127, at 50.
213. The PG-13 rating means that a child under 13 must be accompanied by a parent
or guardian to attend the film. An R rating signifies that a child under 17 must be so
accompanied. An NC-17 rating means that no person under 17 may be admitted under any
circumstances.
214. This is the ACLU's official position. In its policy guide, it asserts, "the X rating,
by placing upon the theater owner the responsibility for barring children under [17], de-
prives parents of the right to determine for themselves what pictures their children may
see." POLICY GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 40 (1986).
215. According to MPAA polls, 70% to 73% of parents find the rating system to be
useful. Collins, supra note 51.
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The reason that the former system intruded on the creative decisions
of writers and directors was that serious movies were rarely financially
viable if the Code and Rating Administration (CARA) slapped them with
an X.216 The MPAA did not trademark the X rating, as it did the
others.217 Pornographers were thus able to coopt the symbol and use
it to promote their films. Many people therefore assumed that all X
movies were pornographic.2 18 As the ACLU noted, "Particularly with
regard to X-rated films, the administration of classification based on
content will tend to act.., as an invitation to boycotters and censorship
drives by local pressure groups against theater owners, especially in
small communities."
219
The big theater chains eschewed controversy and would not show X
movies, nor would many smaller chains and independent theaters.
Furthermore, many movie houses had rental contracts that forbade them
to exhibit films that were rated X. Most television stations, even pay
cable stations, would not show them. Many newspapers and all television
stations refused advertising for X films.
220
To ensure that their films would be exhibited and publicized, most
distributors, when threatened with an X, forced the directors to cut the
films to eliminate the offending material. In 1981, Jack Valenti
estimated that fully one third of the films that CARA viewed were edited
to change the rating.22 1 Filmmakers resubmitted motion pictures again
and again until CARA awarded them the rating that they wanted.
This occurred for the first time just three months after the classifica-
tion program began in 1969. Warner Brothers responded to the financial-
216. M.S. Mason, Revamped Film Rating System: Why It Changed, How It Works,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 1990, at Arts 11 ("an X rating would have spelled
economic suicide for most nonpornographic productions").
217. Larry Rohter,A 'No Children'Category to Replace the "X'Rating, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1990, at Al.
218. In the early years of the rating system, before the producers of skin flicks
appropriated the X rating, an X was not equated with pornography. In fact, Midnight
Cowboy, which was rated X, won the award for Best Picture at the 1969 Academy Awards.
During the classification system's early years, the ratings actually protected violent and
sexual films by discouraging local censorship. Jack Mathews, Hollywood Pendulum May Be
Swinging Back to Social-Revolution Films of 60's, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1988, § 6, at 1.
219. POLICY GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 214, at 40.
Furthermore, the X rating is sometimes a stimulus for state action. In the early 1970s,
Detroit police patronized X films in order to arrest exhibitors for obscenity violations. Also
in the early 1970s, many states adopted or attempted to adopt film regulation statutes
which incorporated the X or the R rating as the substantive standard. Several federal
courts struck down such statutes as violative of the first amendment. See Motion Picture
Assoc. of America, Inc. v. Specter, 315 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Engdahl v. City of
Kenosha, Wisconsin, 317 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
220. Corliss, supra note 190; Rohter, supra note 217.
221. Hodgson, supra note 56. In 1980, CARA rated 26 films X. All were cut to get an
R Id.
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ly disastrous performance of The Girl on a Motorcycle by purging it of its
erotic scenes in order to get an R.22 Subsequently, distributors bowd-
lerized many serious-minded films to avoid an X rating. These included
Taxi Driver, Cruising, Scarface, Angel Heart and 91h Weeks. Writers,
directors and producers censored uncounted other motion pictures to
satisfy the common contractual requirement that they not deliver an X
film.2
23
Distributors who refused to cut a film, yet did not want the toxic X,
had the unattractive option of bypassing the classification system
altogether. Filmmakers rarely chose this path, for NATO theaters, which
comprise 85% of motion picture exhibitors in the United States, will not
show an unrated film.22 Nevertheless, some filmmakers calculated
that the stigma of an X rating was worse than no rating at all. I Am
Curious Yellow, Caligula and Dawn of the Dead all had moderate success
without a rating. Even if unrated films occasionally made money,
however, they almost certainly reached a much smaller audience than
they would have if the ratings system did not exist at all.
In the late 1980s, there was growing dissatisfaction within the film
business about the manner in which the X rating could unfairly
stigmatize nonpornographic movies intended for adults. Adrian Lyne, the
director of 91h Weeks, considered the form of self-censorship represented
by the MPAA classification system to be as insidious as the government
variety. He protested, "People are avoiding making certain types of
movies, and that's real unhealthy."22- Irwin Winkler, a successful
producer, agreed: "I'd like to see the system abolished. I think we should
have the freedom to tell the story as we, the filmmakers, feel it should
be told, without interference and with all the freedom of our imagina-
tion.ii
2
In 1990, the disgruntlement within the film industry over the system
became more vociferous and widespread when CARA assigned the X
rating to a spate of independently-distributed nonpornographic films,
including Tie Me Up, Tie Me Down, Henry: Portrait of a Serial Killer,
The Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover, and Life is Cheap ... But
Toilet Paper is Expensive. The producers of these movies chose to release
222. Ronald Duncan, the writer of the screenplay, complained, "If they remove the sex,
it's like removing the yolk from an egg." X Marks the Spot, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1969, at
101.
223. The MPAA ratings system also led (and still leads) to an odd sort of anti-
purification phenomenon. The G rating is equated with kiddie movies and is thus felt to
spell disaster at the box office for many motion pictures. Consequently, many filmmakers
are thought to slip a dirty word or two into their movies in order to avoid receiving a G.
Hodgson, supra note 56.
224. Friedman, supra note 30, at 216.
225. Corliss, supra note 190, at 72.
226. Hinson, supra note 164.
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them unrated. Miramax Films sued the MPAA to have the X rating
given Tie Me Up changed to an R, but it lost the case.2 In July 1990,
more than thirty leading directors argued in an open letter to Jack
Valenti that "the artistic freedom and integrity of American film makers
are being compromised by an outdated and unfair rating system."M
When a major studio, Universal, found its film Henry and June classified
X, the pressure on the MPAA to change the ratings system in-
creased.2
Finally, in September 1990, the MPAA eliminated the X rating and
replaced it with a new NC-17 category ("No Children Under 17 Admit-
ted"). The criteria that the MPAA uses to confer the new rating are
precisely the same as those previously used to confer an X.M Whereas
the MPAA did not trademark the X rating, however, it has trademarked
NC-17, thus denying pornographers the privilege of using it for films
that they do not submit to the rating system. Although pornographers
are permitted to apply for an NC-17, Jack Valenti doubts they will. He
notes, "I think it would be hard to attract the raincoat crowd with a
rating called NC-17."2'' The MPAA thus intends to designate adult
films in a manner that does not lump nonpornographic movies together
with smut.
It is still too early to determine whether NC-17 is actually more
protective of expression or is, as one critic observed, "little more than a
new way to spell X., 23 2 There is some indication that studios will find
it easier to promote and exhibit NC-17 movies than X movies. Most
major newspapers have decided to publish advertisements for NC-17
films, so long as the advertisements and the films themselves are not
prurient or offensive. Moreover, all three television networks, none
of which accepted advertisements for X movies, have suggested that they
might be willing to accept commercials for some NC-17 films, although
they will run them only during late-night hours.2z  Finally, some
227. Miramax Films Corp. v. Motion Picture Assoc. of America, Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 730
(1990). Miramax challenged the X rating based on a New York State prohibition against
arbitrary and capricious conduct. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R art. 78 (McKinney 1981).
228. Rohter, supra note 217, at C18.
229. Id
230. M.S. Mason, Does the NC-I 7 Rating Equal an X2, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan.
29, 1991, at Arts 13.
231. Rohter, supra note 217, at C18.
232. Janet Maslin, Film View; Is NC-I 7 an X in a Clean Raincoat?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 1990, at B1.
233. Larry Rohter, Resistance to NC-1 7 Rating Develops, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, at
A13. The Birmingham (Alabama) News is one of the few papers that has adopted a general
policy of rejecting advertisements for NC-17 movies, thus treating them the same way that
it previously treated X films. Id.
234. 1d
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theaters that refused to show X films have agreed to exhibit movies rated
NC-17.2
On the other hand, certain negative responses to the NC-17 rating
indicate that it may eventually be viewed no differently from X. Just one
week after the introduction of the rating, town officials in Dedham,
Massachusetts, pressured a local theater to cancel its showing of Henry
and June, which, after being reclassified, had become the first film to be
rated NC-17. The National Council of Churches and the United States
Catholic Conference quickly condemned the new rating as an attempt "to
get sexually exploitative material into general theatrical release" and
encouraged theaters not to exhibit NC-17 movies. 2  Donald Wildmon,
the leader of the American Family Association, accused the MPAA of
trying to "mainstream pornography.",23 7 In January 1991, Blockbuster
Video, the country's largest video retailer, announced, perhaps in
response to Wildmon's pressure, that it would not stock any film rated
NC-17. 2
Some distributors of sexually explicit movies are submitting their films
to the ratings board in order to receive NC-17 labels. 2 This trend may
thwart the MPAA's intention to distinguish quality adult films from
pornography. If this blurring continues, the NC-17 rating may eventually
lead to as much repression of free expression in the cinema as its
progenitor did.240
The third basic method of self-regulation, in addition to seals of
approval and restrictive classification, is the use of advisory ratings.
Advisory ratings serve only to inform parents; they do not formally
restrict the ability of children to receive a medium.2" For example, the
235. Mason, supra note 230.
236. Rohter, supra note 233.
237. David J. Fox, Blockbuster Video Rates NC-17 Films Unsuitable forAll, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1991, at Fl.
238. 1d
239. David J. Fox, Building Controversy Over NC-1 7; MPAA Opposes Attempt to Turn
New Guidelines on Adult Fare Into Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1990, at Fl.
240. By 1992, there was evidence that NC-17 was acquiring the same stigmatic effect
that X had. Many movie theaters, especially in malls, would not show NC-17 films, some
newspapers, magazines and television stations refused to carry advertisements for them,
and several major video outlets did not carry them. It thus appeared that NC-17 would
diminish the profits of movies in the same way X did (Henry and June, the last major
studio film to carry an NC-17 rating, grossed a disappointing $11.6 million.). As a result,
when Basic Instinct received a preliminary NC-17 rating from the MPAA, the movie's
director, Paul Verhoeven, faced pressure from his producer and distributor to edit the film
in order to get an R rating. Bernard Weinraub, Violent Melodrama of a Sizzling Movie
Brings Rating Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at C15; Richard Corliss, Whatever Became
of NC-17?, TIME, Jan. 27, 1992, at 64.
241. It should be noted that, so long as ratings do not inhibit availability, they can
actually be counterproductive by informing children (and adults) which items are least
acceptable, and thus most seductive. Nat Hentoff predicts that "[k]ids will go zipping
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warning label used by record companies is an advisory rating; it alerts
parents to the presence of "explicit lyrics" but it does not stop youngsters
from buying the album.2 2 Susan Baker defended this system by point-
ing out, "We're not telling kids they can't buy these records. We just
want the rating out there so parents can see it and say to their children,
'We need to talk about this.' Or they can say 'Go right ahead, kids.'
That's their right, too."2
' 3
However, even purely advisory ratings can stifle expression by serving
as warning beacons to censorship groups, as the MPAA's X rating did. A
number of major record store chains refuse to stock albums with warning
stickers in order to avoid conflicts with pressure groups.2 " Many
stores, while not adopting a general policy of rejecting all labeled albums,
have decided to drop potentially offensive records,2 5 and the stickers
surely indicate to them which records are most problematic. There are
also reports that mall leases will start to prohibit tenants from selling
stickered albums. 6 Moreover, radio stations might start to decline to
play songs from such albums in order to avoid arousing the ire of the
FCC.2 7
Clearly, the seal of approval approach suppresses expression more
completely than the classification methods. It is important to recognize,
however, that rating systems are not merely harmless efforts to protect
children. Restrictive classification programs, such as the MPAA ratings
system, abridge the rights of parents to control their children's access to
information and expression. Furthermore, all ratings systems violate the
rights of both artists and their audiences by impeding the dissemination
of much controversial material.
through the record bins looking for [labeled] albums." Hentoff, supra note 171, at 31. When
asked how he would feel about being required to package all sexually explicit albums in
plain paper packaging, one record company executive exclaimed, "God, how I wish that
would happen. I've got some real dogs, but if I'm ordered to put a plain wrapper on them,
they'll begin to move!" Id.
242. On the other hand, outside forces have compelled some stores to transform the
RIAA's advisory ratings system into a restrictive classification system. In the wake of the
conviction of Charles Freeman and the arrest of several other record-store owners, a
number of large record-store chains, in order to discourage prosecutions on charges of
selling pornography to minors, have adopted policies of not selling labeled albums to
minors. Trans World, Wax Works, Disc Jockey, Musicland, and Sam Goody have adopted
such a policy. Philips, supra note 189.
243. Morthland, supra note 159, at 87.
244. Among the chains that have adopted this policy are Sears, J.C. Penney and Disc
Jockey. See Adler & Foote, supra note 190, at 57; MARTIN & SEGRAVE, supra note 160, at
305.
245. Philips, supra note 189.
246. Chuck Philips, A War on Many Fronts; Censorship: 1990 Was the Year That 'Free
Expression' Ran Head-On Into 'Moral Concern' But the Conflict May Only Be Beginning,
LA. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1990, at Fl.
247. See supra part I.C.
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B. ARRANGEMENTS THAT BIND THE PURVEYORS
VS. ARRANGEMENTS THAT Do NOT
The self-censorship systems this article has examined are all based on
agreements among companies that are primarily responsible for
distributing a medium -- the movie studios, the comic book publishers,
the television networks and the record companies. These "distribu-
tors,"2" through their trade associations, agree to regulate content. If
there are no non-complying distributors, such an accord will suffice to
suppress or classify all unacceptable material. On the other hand, if
there are alternative distribution channels, and there usually are, the
creators of controversial material can successfully disseminate their
product so long as there are purveyors -- that is exhibitors or sellers --
who are willing to handle it. Therefore, the overall effectiveness of a self-
censorship mechanism depends largely on whether the purveyors of a
given medium are also bound to follow the agreement.
The cooperation of the purveyors may be guaranteed by the very
structure of an industry. For example, the motion picture industry under
the old studio system was a vertically integrated oligopoly; in 1945, the
five major studios possessed controlling interests in at least 70/o of the
critical first run theaters in cities with populations exceeding
100,000.249 Consequently, these theaters would not under any circum-
stances exhibit a motion picture that did not bear a seal of approval from
the Hays Office. The distributors' direct control over the most important
purveyors was a major reason for the extraordinary success of the motion
picture code. As discussed earlier, when, in United States v. Paramount
Pictures,2' the federal courts stripped the studios of their top-to-bottom
control of the industry on antitrust grounds, exhibitors were free to
bargain for and choose the pictures that they believed audiences wanted
to see, with or without the seal. The new competition in exhibition
greatly diminished the MPAA's power over motion picture content
through the Production Code.
Because of the antitrust laws, it is unlikely that such a vertical
monopoly could ever exist again. Even if the purveyors of a medium are
independent from the distributors, however, they can still be counted on
to comply with a self-regulation procedure if they themselves are parties
to the agreement. This is the way that the MPAA ensured that exhibitors
would comply with its ratings program; it persuaded the National
Association of Theater Owners (NATO) to agree to sign on to the system.
248. In this section, the word "distributor" is not used in any trade-specific sense but
rather generally to signify the companies that stand atop the industry and market the
creative product under their own aegis.
249. See supra note 32.
250. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
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About 85% of American theaters are members of this association. 251
Therefore, most theaters in the country refuse to show unrated movies.
Until its demise, the success of the Television Code also rested on the
fact that so many purveyors -- television stations -- were signatories to
the code. Although networks dominated the NAB and distributed much
of the nation's programming, FCC rules allowed them to own and operate
only a few stations each. Most TV stations were network affiliates or
independents. If just the networks themselves had subscribed to the
Television Code, all of these other stations could have aired programs
that did not conform to the Television Code with impunity. This was not
the case, however -- in 1978, over 65% of all commercial TV stations
subscribed to the Television Code, and they accounted for approximately
85% of all television viewing. 252 As a result, adherence to the Television
Code was extremely widespread. 2
There are some self-censorship arrangements in which the purveyors
are neither voluntarily nor involuntarily bound to comply with the
agreement. These self-policing systems are the least likely to suppress
expression, for they do not impede non-complying distributors' ability to
market their goods. The record companies' current warning-sticker
program is an example of this type of arrangement. Record stores have
not joined the agreement. Therefore, they still stock the albums of
companies who refuse to label their explicit records.
When the Comics Code was adopted in 1954, the primary purveyors of
comic books were newsstands, drug stores, variety stores and supermar-
kets. While the publishers of comic books bound themselves to the code,
those who sold them did not. The CMAA nevertheless expected news-
stands and stores to refuse to stock comic books without a seal. Indeed,
William Gaines' company initially stayed out of the association but joined
251. Hodgson, supra note 56.
252. United States v. National Assoc. of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D.D.C.
1982).
253. The current relationship between networks and TV stations is loosely parallel to
the current relationship between movie studios and theaters. In its early years, however,
the structure of the broadcasting industry more closely resembled that of the pre-
Paramount film industry than that of the modern film industry. CBS and NBC owned or
controlled many of the most important stations and, according to a 1941 FCC report on
chain broadcasting, they maintained contracts with their affiliates that "resulted in a
grossly inequitable relation." CHESTER ET AL., supra note 34, at 84. Some of these contracts
contained "exclusive affiliation" clauses which forbade affiliates from airing any other
network's programs and forced stations to dedicate most of their schedule to network
programming. In other words, the networks controlled stations in much the same way that
the studios controlled theaters. If this situation had persisted, the Television Code could
have governed most programming even if the networks were the only signatories to it.
The television industry, however, experienced its own Paramount-type ruling. In 1941,
the FCC issued eight specific regulations designed to loosen the networks' monopolistic
control over their outlets. These regulations are still in effect today. See CHESTER ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 84-85; STERLING & KrTrRoS, supra note 112, at 189-92.
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when Gaines learned from dealers that they would not handle his comics
without a seal.- The merchandisers were probably worried that
pressure groups would target them for harassment if they sold Unap-
proved comic books.
Although newsstands and stores generally cooperated on an informal
basis, they were not quite so compliant as the association believed that
they would be. The two large publishers whose magazines did not carry
the Comics Code symbol -- Dell, which published mainly children's
cartoons and Gilberton, which specialized in "classic comics" -- did not
suffer a perceptible drop in sales. z' Furthermore, a new adult satirical
comic magazine, Mad, ignored the Comics Code completely and still
achieved a high circulation through the traditional outlets. In the early
sixties, a publisher successfully marketed a new line of horror comics.
And in 1971, Marvel, a member of the CMAA, breached the code by
releasing a series of Spiderman stories about drugs without the seal.
Newsstands did not hesitate to sell the magazines. In fact, the success
of the series impelled the CMAA to issue a guideline the same year
permitting the responsible treatment of substance abuse.25
As mentioned previously, the current Comics Code contains a huge
loophole. It not only fails to bind newsstands and stores to the agreement
but also explicitly permits the distribution of comics without the seal
through specialty shops. The Comics Code has thus become one of the
most ineffective media codes that ever existed.
C. INTERNAL CENSORS VS. INDUSTRY CENSORS
VS. OUTSIDE CENSORS
As we have seen, pressure groups and the government force self-
censorship systems on industries. Without outside pressure, people in the
media business would infrequently choose not to disseminate material for
moral reasons. They are for the most part motivated by profit. They want
to sell what customers want to hear, read or see -- to buy.
Companies that distribute films, comic books, TV programs or rock
albums are reluctant to expurgate items that more people would want to
receive in their uncensored form. Therefore, a self-regulation system that
gives the companies themselves the right to make the regulatory
decisions is the least dangerous to free expression. The current RIAA
agreement is such a system. Each record company is allowed to make
its own judgment about which albums should receive warning stickers.
254. Ruth Inglis, The Comic Book Problem, AM. MERCURY, Aug. 1955, at 117.
255. STEEF DAVIDSON, PENGUIN BOOK OF POLITICAL COMICS 19 (Hester Velmans &
Marianne Velmans trans., 1982).
256. Lawrence Van Gelder, Comic Book Industry to Allow Stories on Narcotics, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1971, at 34. Today, the CMAA code formally includes this policy. CODE OF
THE COMICS MAGAZINE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, supra note 2.
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If a company concludes that labeling an album will limit its availability,
it is likely to leave the sticker off in order to boost sales.
From the point of view of enemies of the media, this sort of arrange-
ment is akin to letting inmates serve as their own prison guards. 7 An
intermediate, and more effective, enforcement mechanism is to have a
body made up of industry representatives apply the code or ratings
system. Its judgments will not be based on the financial interests of the
specific company at issue. On the other hand, because of its concern for
the general health of the industry and its likely bias in favor of free
speech, such a body will tend not to censor material too zealously.
The MPAA and CMAA both take such an approach, as did the NAB
when the Television Code was still in operation. Each of these associa-
tions recruits people from outside the industry to perform the first review
of the material but then allows a body composed of industry representa-
tives to overrule the initial decision.
In the motion picture ratings system, the chairman of the Code and
Ratings Administration (CARA) and the eleven "average" parents who
serve as its members render the initial decision.2 8 If a filmmaker
disputes CARA's determination, he may appeal it to the Code and
Ratings Appeals Board, which is made up of the MPAA president, twelve
representatives from member studios, eight exhibitors from the NATO
Board of Directors, two producers from the Producers' Guild of America,
and two representative from International Film Importers and Distribu-
tors of America. From 1968 to 1988, 216 ratings were appealed, and
about 45% were overturned. 2s 9
In the comic book industry, the Comics Code administrator (who is not
a publisher) and his staff determine whether a publication should receive
the seal of approval. If a publisher disputes the administrator's decision,
he may appeal it to the permanent committee, composed of representa-
tives from CMAA member companies.
In the NAB's self-policing arrangement, the Code Authority Director
and his executive staff had the primary responsibility for monitoring
stations and identifying breaches of the Television Code. They reported
alleged violations to the Television Review Board, a body of broadcasters
who subscribed to the Television Code. If the review board decided that
257. As noted earlier, from 1930 to 1934, the MPAA left conformance with the new
Production Code to the individual studio's discretion. As a result, moviemakers virtually
ignored the Production Code. Similarly, record companies under the current arrangement
are allowed to decide for themselves when to apply a warning label to an album. They
seldom do.
258. The president of the MPAA, currently Jack Valenti, has the power to appoint and
dismiss the chairman of CARA. The chairman, currently Richard Heffner, in turn has the
power to appoint the members of CARA. The president of the MPAA cannot fire a CARA
member. This arrangement shields them from industry pressure. Hodgson, supra note 56.
259. Hinson, supra note 164.
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a breach had occurred, it sent the matter to the Television Board of
Directors for final disposition.
In each of these systems, although people theoretically independent of
industry pressure render the initial decision, bodies composed of people
from the industry render the final resolution. Consequently, the codes
are not ultimately enforced with excessive moral fervor by individuals
unconcerned with free speech rights and media profits.
The most suppressive type of self-censorship arrangement is one where
an industry voluntarily surrenders the entire review process to industry
outsiders. One example of this type of system was the TV blacklist of the
early 1950s. In 1950, at the height of the Red Scare, the American
Business Consultants, a firm composed of three former FBI agents,
issued a pamphlet titled Red Channels: The Report of Communist
Influence in Radio and Television." This booklet provided background
information on 151 broadcasting personalities whom it accused of being
Communists or Communist sympathizers. Soon afterward, another
organization printed lists of allegedly communist writers and actors in
a publication called Aware.2
1
Advertisers pressured broadcasters not to hire men and women who
appeared on these lists.262 The profit motive, which often motivates the
media to oppose censorship, in this case led the television industry to
accept it. Broadcasters refused to give jobs to blacklisted individuals.
They did not even perform independent evaluations of the accuracy of
the charges made against these performers and writers. The motion
picture industry also used blacklists during this paranoid era, but
Murray Schumach notes that there was a difference:
The movie industry, though greatly influenced by the same groups that
imposed a blacklist on television, retained final control of the use of the
blacklist. Television abdicated even this limited authority.., the actual
decisions were dictated to them by outside groups .... They grumbled
against these outsiders .... but they never failed to try to placate
them. 
2W
By handing their hiring decisions over to zealots wholly unconcerned
with the welfare or artistic integrity of their medium, TV broadcasters
committed a particularly virulent kind of self-regulation.
The four case studies suggest that the repressive nature of a self-
censorship arrangement depends primarily on the repressive potential
of the government. It is apparent, however, that the particular structure
of a self-censorship system also helps to determine its potency. If the
260. STERLING & KiTrRoS, supra note 112, at 307.
261. Id. at 364.
262. Id. at 307.
263. SCHUMACH, supra note 6, at 235-36.
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record industry, as is likely, is coerced into forming a stricter and more
elaborate self-regulation mechanism in the future, it should carefully
consider the details of that mechanism. The freedom of expression of
both performers and listeners will depend on its decisions.
